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Abstract
A longstanding folk belief suggests that “busy” people possess the ability to get
more done than others. Busyness, defined as the demands of everyday life, has been
shown to generate cognitive load, which has been called “cognitive busyness.” Although
most cognitive theory would deny the possibility that cognitive load may enhance
performance, some recent research may support the possibility. Cowan's 1988
information-processing model was used to study how measures of everyday busyness
correlated with performance on cognitive tasks. The research question addressed whether
any combination of such measures, in combination with working memory, could predict
performance on such tasks. 92 participants, paid workers with Amazon Mechanical Turk,
engaged in an online process, starting with completion of a validated self-report
instrument to measure busyness. They then participated in 2 activities, structured as
games and designed to measure working memory and cognitive performance. Multiple
regressions, linear and nonlinear, were used to identify significant predictors of
performance. Results of the analyses did not reveal any evidence for significant
relationships between the variables. Additionally, “volitional busyness” did not appear to
enhance, or even affect, performance on a planning task. Further research exploring the
effect of these variables on a working memory-based task may be worthwhile, if only to
confirm the present findings. This project might benefit linguists tracking semantic
change, showing how a term may adopt an entirely different meaning and suggesting
further refinement in identifying such shifts over the years; psychologists exploring
cognitive load and its effects; and social psychologists interested in making corrections to
popular perceptions of the value of tradition gender-associated tasks.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
There is an old popular belief that some people are identifiably “busy” as a quality
or trait, and that such people derive certain advantages from that condition. Typically,
this has been expressed in terms of ability to take on more tasks and perform them more
efficiently than most.
I first became aware of this concept through the somewhat-serious Parkinson’s
law, perhaps the first popular book on management theory (Parkinson, 1957). The book
opens with the statement, “Work expands to fill the time available for its completion”
(Parkinson, 1957, p. 2), dubbed “Parkinson’s first law.” Although the thesis is facetiously
stated in the beginning, Parkinson wrote from knowledge and experience, as a military
officer, naval historian, and university professor (Rogers, 1993). Subsequent research
(Aronson & Gerard, 1966; Aronson & Landy, 1967; Brannon, Hershberger, & Brock,
1999) substantiated the presence of the “Parkinson Effect.” Discovering that Parkinson’s
thesis had some merit led me to look more closely at Parkinson’s supporting statement
for the law, offered as an exception: The “law” did not apply to busy people. Indeed,
asserted Parkinson (1957), using a classic statement of the belief, “It is the busiest man
who has time to spare” (p. 2). The apparent implication, on which Parkinson expanded, is
that busy people get more done.
This prevalent and longstanding piece of folk wisdom—busy people have
extraordinary abilities to take on and complete even more work than they already have,
and to complete it more efficiently than others who are less busy—is repeated in

2
management science (Gutierrez & Kouvelis, 1991; Reimann, 1979). However, according
to most cognitive theorists, being occupied by many simultaneous tasks should consume
cognitive resources, thereby increasing cognitive load or cognitive busyness (Gilbert and
Osborne, 1989) and degrading general cognitive abilities (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). This
dissertation examined whether the folk belief persists in the absence of evidence, or if
there is any evidentiary basis for the assertion.
Background of the Study
Many observers have commented on the effects of cognitive load on task
performance. Early researchers suggested the effect was unquestionably deleterious (e.g.,
Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), in that increasing cognitive load (e.g., by attempted
performance of simultaneous tasks) would reliably degrade performance. Later
researchers built on this assertion, repudiating, for example, the existence of support for
cognitive multitasking (Tombu & Jolicœur, 2004). Others, however, questioned the
assumption, including those revisiting their own earlier work (Baddeley, 2003). In recent
years, researchers noted that cognitive load may even enhance performance in certain
task types or in certain task areas . Some noted the adoption of strategies that appeared to
mitigate the otherwise-deleterious effects of cognitive load; strategies that typically
required reduced amounts of (at that point, scarce) cognitive or working memory
resources (Beilock & DeCaro, 2007; Hoffmann et al., 2013). Among such noted
strategies were the adoption of similarity-based rather than rule-based decision making
(Hoffmann et al., 2013); the reduction of the number of strategies used in decision
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making; and increased adoption of automatic over controlled processing (Jaeggi et al.,
2007).
However, researchers have not studied cognitive load in a positive light, and
noninduced load has hardly been studied at all. So far, such research and theoretical work
on cognitive load have been experimentally based (with rare exceptions, e.g., Milgram’s
[1974] “urban overload” hypothesis), using induced cognitive load and assuming adverse
effects. Those who have noted environmentally related load viewed it, typically, through
the lens of deleterious effects on cognitively demanding tasks, including social
interaction and relations (Milgram, 1974), learning (Sweller, 1988), and compliance with
medication regimes (Martin & Park, 2003; Whitbourne, Neupert, & Lachman, 2008).
Atypically, some researchers have noted that a degree of cognitive load could be
advantageous (Hoffmann et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2005; Pontari & Schlenker, 2000) or
mentioned in passing some circumstances in which they observed anomalous, apparently
positive effects (Bryan & Harter, 1897).
The standard practice in research requiring the presence of cognitive load is to
induce it in standard fashion where needed, such as by imposing simultaneous dual-task
operations (Oberauer, Lange, & Engle, 2004; Süß, Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, &
Schulze, 2002), imposing dual memory and processing tasks (Barrouillet, Bernardin,
Portrat, Vergauwe, & Camos, 2007; Cowan et al., 2005; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, &
Engle, 2005), or distracting by requiring processing of an unrelated input (Darowski,
Helder, Zacks, Hasher, & Hambrick, 2008). However, researchers employing such
methods have also commented on the relation to the load induced by environmental
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demands, such as being around other people (Hoffmann et al., 2013; Milgram, 1974).
Gilbert and Osborne (1989) even asserted that such induction is no more than a
replication of environmentally related load: “[B]usyness-inducing tasks … are merely
experimental mimics of the many resource-consuming tasks of ordinary life” (p. 940).
Everyday tasks and activities, the overhead of daily living, make their own demands on
cognitive resources (Martin & Park, 2003). The product of such “environmental
demands” (Martin & Park, 2003, p. 77) is cognitive load. (Indeed, recognizing this,
Gilbert and Osborne used the term cognitive busyness for cognitive load, to link it more
closely to the increased load level generated by increased activity.)
Research participants therefore enter the laboratory with a preexisting level of
cognitive load. I have, however, identified no studies in which continuing cognitive load
has been incorporated into experimental work. Rather, researchers seem to assume that
environmentally related cognitive load may be ignored, discounted, or should be
minimized in the laboratory. Thus, although cognitive load is much studied (Kirschner,
Ayres, & Chandler, 2011) and anomalies in expected results have been noted (Hoffmann
et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2005; Pontari & Schlenker, 2000), few researchers have explored
the possibility that cognitive load derived from environmental demands might have a
positive effect in certain circumstances or for a subset of people. The studies reported in
this dissertation are notable exceptions. I surmised that the standard practice of inducing
cognitive load and ignoring any preexisting, environmentally generated load may be
attributed to one or more of three strictures.
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Measurement Conventions
It is common practice to measure simple binary states of cognitive load (on/off) or
at least low/medium/high (Hoffmann et al., 2013). This practice tends to promote the use
of induced cognitive load, as it offers the experimenter greater control over both presence
and strength.
Instrumentation Deficits
Before 2001, most instruments for the measurement of environmentally based
cognitive load were variously incomplete or complicated to administer, focusing on
isolated aspects of environmental or everyday demands rather than taking a holistic view
(Martin & Park, 2003). However, all shared the assumption that such environmental
demands influence the ability to perform cognitive tasks, as suggested by Gilbert and
Osborne (1989).
Concerns About Validity
The validity of measurement amidst the possible “noise” implicit in correlational
research is a standard design concern. The controlled nature of experimentally induced
cognitive load leads to greater certainty—confidence— that the variable being studied is
the independent variable leading to changes in the dependent variable. Correlational
research has more “noise”—that is, more extraneous variables—that may lead to less
confidence. Such concerns led to the near-exclusion from cognitive research of an
important influence on the performance of tasks in everyday lives: environmentally
generated cognitive load.
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Problem Statement
Everyday activities create cognitive load, introducing the possibility of
conducting research using participants in the very condition of cognitive load that
artificial methods of load induction seek to screen out and then replicate (Gilbert &
Osborne, 1989). The notion of “state busyness”—a level of environmentally induced,
little-varying, background cognitive load—may now be introduced into the research
process.
However, the level of environmental busyness as it happens to exist in
participants’ lives, by virtue of having a job, family, friends, and acquaintances, may be
inflated by accidents of family demands, economic position, or employment necessities.
A more useful study might consider the effect of busyness beyond the regular, enforced
demands of life and including an element of choice or adopted lifestyle—such as that
presumably experienced by those individuals perceived as “busy people,” noted in
management theory and popular wisdom. That inclusion would encompass the difference
between the regular demands of looking after a family and the voluntary addition of the
duties of being the neighborhood “soccer mom/dad” or multisport coach. In another
sphere, the comparison would be between the regular demands of a job, plus running the
office fantasy football league, social calendar, or union activities. The level of such
“volitional busyness” might offer a better measure of the level of environmentally
induced cognitive load taken on by an individual over and above the needs of daily
survival.
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Additional environmental demands will add to cognitive load (Gilbert & Osborne,
1989), and cognitive theory states that cognitive overload/busyness diminishes cognitive
performance (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Lieberman, 2000). Lieberman (2000) attributed
the deleterious effects of cognitive load on processing to its impact on working memory.
The impact of reduced working memory on cognitive performance is an important and
accepted part of cognitive theory (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Miller, 1956). However,
established exceptions show performance actually improving. These improvements may
be demonstrated empirically. Accordingly, I hypothesized that some people keep
themselves in a condition of high environmental demands—acquire a self-induced level
of structural cognitive load—because they perceive the consequent additional cognitive
load brings them cognitive advantage. People acquire the additional task-load (i.e.,
cognitive load) gradually as they learn it enables them to function better. The drivers to
the behavior (the gradual acquisition of additional “structural” cognitive load) may
include an enhanced sense of self-efficacy at getting more done than others, better
problem-solving or judgment skills, or better thinking or processing ability (possibly in
defined areas, e.g., Jaeggi et al., 2007). One important factor to be considered was how
the impact of such load varies with differing levels of working memory. For example, is
the effect more pronounced with low innate working memory, or is it perhaps an adaptive
mechanism to compensate for low working memory by making better use of available
resources? Or is increased self-induced cognitive load perhaps related to high working
memory, again attempting to make greater use of resources otherwise underused?
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This additional load may be considered “volitional,” because it is not essential to
the performance of routine or structural daily tasks but exists in excess of such
requirements and is adopted as a strategy by an individual. This volitional addition of
cognitive load may create an advantage, akin to the ability to multitask (found in about
2.5% of participants—Watson & Strayer, 2010), or to function under very high levels of
cognitive load (Jaeggi et al., 2007). The level of “volitional busyness” creating the
additional load might offer a better measure of the level of an individual’s “adopted”
environmentally induced cognitive load.
Purpose of the Study
This quantitative correlational study identified and described the cognitive
performance of a group of people whose levels of volitional busyness differed.
Specifically, I sought to identify, if they exist, subgroups of people whose cognitive
performance improved—rather than deteriorating or remaining unchanged—with greater
volitional busyness.
Research Questions
For this project, I gathered data to test the hypothesis that in addition to working
memory, the level of volitional or self-induced busyness, as derived from the two Martin
& Park Environmental Demands Questionnaire (MPEDQ) measures Busyness and
Routine, is also a predictor of performance on a cognitive task.
Therefore, the overall research questions were the following:
RQ1: Is busyness related to performance on a cognitive task?
Null Hypothesis 1: Busyness is unrelated to performance on a cognitive task.
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Alternative hypothesis: Busyness is associated with performance on a
cognitive task.
RQ2: Is routine related to performance on a cognitive task?
Null Hypothesis 2: Routine is unrelated to performance on a cognitive task.
Alternative hypothesis: Routine is associated with performance on a cognitive
task.
RQ3: Is working memory related to performance on a cognitive task?
Null Hypothesis 3: Working memory is unrelated to performance on a cognitive
task.
Alternative hypothesis: Working memory is associated with performance on a
cognitive task.
RQ4: Do busyness, routine, and working memory predict performance on a
cognitive task?
Null Hypothesis 4: None of the independent variables busyness, routine, and
working memory predict performance on a cognitive task.
Alternative hypothesis: At least one of the variables busyness, routine, and
working memory predict performance on a cognitive task.
Theoretical Framework
Working Memory and Cognitive Load
Researchers offered the first descriptions and models of the mechanisms for
“normal human information processing” (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974, p. 47) in the 1950s
(Cowan, 1988). In 1974, Baddeley and Hitch proposed that the “tasks of reasoning,
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comprehension and learning” (p. 49) took place in a system combining various proposed
information stores, collectively termed working memory (WM). The researchers also
studied the ability of the system to carry out more than one task. Notably, Baddeley and
Hitch observed that when the system was tasked with performing two operations
simultaneously—in this case, “reasoning and recall”—full performance in one was only
achieved at the cost of poor performance in the other. They described the effect of such
dual-task challenges as cognitive load. This research, with subsequent refinements
(notably, Baddeley, 2001; Bayliss, Jarrold, Gunn, & Baddeley, 2003) formed the basis of
theory on such information processing in subsequent decades.
Working memory capacity limitation. The level of cognitive load becomes
important in a working memory system that has only limited capacity, as it will limit the
cognitive processing capacity that remains available. The proposition of such a limitation
is generally attributed to Miller (1956), although that work itself references Miller’s own
and others’ work from preceding years. Miller discussed “channel capacity” for making
judgments on a single factor. Based on a meta-analysis of research on a range of variables
and stimuli (including saltiness of a solution, pitch of a musical note, and loudness of a
sound), Miller concluded that people have an inbuilt limitation on the number of values
they can retain. (However, Miller also noted Pollack’s study, in which people with
absolute pitch could identify many times the average number detected by those without
such a facility, although Miller demurred on considering why this should be so.)
Miller’s estimate for this inbuilt limitation of working memory capacity,
expressed in terms of distinguishable alternatives, was a mean of about 6.5 categories.
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One standard deviation includes from four to 10 categories, and the total range is from 3
to 12 categories. “Considering the wide variety of different variables that have been
studied, I find this to be a remarkably narrow range” (Miller, 1956, p. 86). Miller (1956)
proposed that this constituted what he called the “span of absolute judgment” (p. 90).
Cowan (2001) and Cowan, Morey, Chen, Gilchrist, and Saults (2008) further explored
the concept of such a limitation, concluding that the limit was closer to four categories or
simultaneous representations.
Definition of Terms
Cognitive busyness/Cognitive load: The term cognitively busy was apparently first
used by Gilbert and Krull (1988) to describe subjects under cognitive load from a
standard dual-task induction—undertaking a second task while working on a primary
task. It was further explained by Gilbert and Osborne (1989), and their explanatory
footnote bears full reproduction:
We use the term cognitive busyness rather than the more familiar cognitive load
because (a) busyness describes a mental state rather than the activity that gives
rise to that state, and (b) load lends itself rather comically to use as an adjective
(e.g., “The loaded subjects were unable to locate their fingers during the power
failure”). (Gilbert & Osborne, 1989, Footnote 1, p. 940)
Later, Lieberman (2000) defined cognitive busyness as “effects on task A when
working memory is being used to complete task B” (p. 484).
Gilbert and Osborne (1989) made one further observation that lies at the heart of
this research. Their study reflected the effect of induced load, but they commented that
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such “busyness-inducing tasks (Gilbert, 1989) … are merely experimental mimics of the
many resource-consuming tasks of ordinary life”(Gilbert & Osborne, 1989, p. 940).
Environmental demands: “The many resource-consuming tasks of ordinary life”
(Gilbert & Osborne, 1989, p. 940) are themselves a significant source of cognitive load—
so much so that load induction in experimental situations merely imitates the effects of
such daily tasks. Gilbert and Osborne (1989) were primarily concerned with cognitive
busyness as generated by social interactions and the self-regulation—the continuous
process of self-monitoring and self-correction through which people maintain
interpersonal identities and objectives—involved in such social interaction. Milgram
(1974) alluded to similar concerns in the “urban overload” hypothesis. However, the
demands of daily life may differ, often substantially, from person to person. Some lives
may be organized around social interaction, others around directly cognitive tasks (e.g.,
management of an enterprise, a household, or a family; or diagnosis and repair of
malfunctions in humans or machinery). Others may be engaged in primarily creative
endeavors (e.g., writing, painting, or designing). The list could readily be expanded.
Park et al. (1999) and Park and Hall Gutchess (2000) reported that such demands
of daily living interfered with cognitive performance in older adults. Park and Hall
Gutchess also noted that routine tasks become automatic and as such require little
cognitive processing for their completion. Martin and Park (2003) posited that such life
demands could be quantified largely by frequency or density, as well as by the degree to
which the tasks were familiar or novel. Responding to their perception of a need for a
different type of instrument, one that both comprehensively surveyed aspects of everyday
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life and took into account these characteristics of task performance, Martin and Park
designed the Martin and Park Environmental Demands Questionnaire (MPEDQ),
specifically related to the cognitive demands of daily living. They asserted that data
generated on the Busyness scale were significantly associated with the ability to perform
a cognitive task (in this case, adhering to a medication regime) and formed a more
reliable predictor of that ability than working memory or aging. Martin and Park
quantified the demands using two variables—Busyness (the density of demands of daily
tasks) and Routine (the degree to which daily tasks are familiar, and thus less demanding;
Park et al., 1999; Park & Hall Gutchess, 2000)
Volitional busyness: The degree to which an element of busyness, over and above
the structural demands of the individual’s daily life, has been adopted by an individual. I
suggest that by comparing the two scales of the MPEDQ, it may be possible to
differentiate between those who perceive themselves to be busy in their daily lives (and
who indeed remain at a fairly constant level of task loading), those who maintain a
personal perception of busyness that is not supported by data, those who are actually
overwhelmed by their daily burdens, and those who are actually busy but evidently able
to perform as needed.
Assumptions and Limitations
In general, I assumed participants would understand the questions posed in this
study and answer them truthfully. I assumed no participants would submit duplicate
entries. I accepted Miller and Park’s description of the age group on which their study
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was validated, as well as their statement that other factors such as education level did not
significantly affect the results generated by the instrument.
External Validity
The MPEDQ was initially designed for and tested with a population of individuals
with rheumatoid arthritis. Although the instrument designers (Martin & Park, 2003)
pointed out the extension of the applicable population by validation, the instrument
would seem specialized and not readily generalizable. It has been used in one large-scale
study (Soubelet & Salthouse, 2010; N = 2,257) of adults who were not selected by health
status or specific age. The study reported coefficients of reliability for Busyness and
Routine of .88 and .81, respectively, with a correlation between the scales of -0.31.
Additionally, the instrument only accounts for busyness arising from task-based,
perceived demands and not directly for cognitive busyness arising from other sources
(e.g., social interaction, the need to make constant assessments of others, neuroticism,
etc.). However, the instrument does offer a base-level measure of busyness that is
represented in the resultant data.
Construct Validity
Whether cognitive busyness is a valid construct for cognitive load is a debate that
reaches back to Gilbert and Osborne (1989), who simply stated that it was so. The study
offered the possibility of extending that concept and demonstrating that the difference
between life-determined (or structural) task load and overall task load can be considered
self-imposed. I do not intend this construct to imply that task load is consciously adopted
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or imposed; rather, I intend it to indicate that it is attributable to the adopted lifestyle of
the individual.
Significance of the Study
This project sits at the intersection of two contemporary social concerns. The first
involves the focusing of attention on the performance of cognitive tasks. With both
education and employment becoming more demanding of concentration at a fine level,
and with diagnosed attentional disorders currently at an incidence of 4-12% in children
(Getahun et al, 2013) and averaging 3.4% in adults (Fayyad et al, 2007), any cognitively
based scheme offering the possibility of conscious refining of attention (i.e., more
efficient use of working memory) could offer clear benefits both individually and
societally. Just as one example, one standard classroom accommodation for youths with
attentional disorders is seating placement away from “distracting stimuli”—a move to a
quieter place. (I am commonly involved, professionally, with the specification of such
schemes.) In fact, there is a general impetus to keep classrooms hushed and “undistracting.” What would it suggest for the design of classrooms if it were found that
additional environmental demands, in the form of multiple inputs and/or social demands,
could actually assist concentration and cognitive processing? We may see some of this in
informal implementation where students choose to study with multiple media inputs, or
in libraries or study halls with a high degree of interpersonal interaction rather than in the
quiet of a dorm room. Another indicator may be offered by the work being done by Cook
et al. (2015) and Helps et al (2014) incorporating the use of white noise in the didactic
environment for attentionally challenged youth.
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Directing more cognitive resources toward processing core cognitive tasks may be
viewed as increasing the efficiency of processing resources. If such a process could be
demonstrated in cognitive processing, then it would suggest an ability to improve
cognitive efficiency. The assertions of Colom, Rebollo, Palacios, Juan-Espinosa, and
Kyllonen (2004) regarding the close association between g—a measure of general
intelligence which, as Colom et al. note, is “common to all tests of ability” (p. 278)--and
working memory would suggest that a boost in working memory efficiency would be a
boost to g as well. The existence of a process under the control of the individual to
enhance working memory would offer a new dimension to discussions of the malleability
of intelligence and the way in which information is processed.
Looking at the reverse implications of an upheld hypothesis, what of those
individuals who have been taking advantage of additional environmental demands to
improve their cognitive performance, only to lose those environments? Unemployment,
sickness, promotion, relocation—any of these could place an individual, suddenly, in a
nonoptimal environment. When such an event occurs, how can an individual adapt and
maintain cognitive abilities at the former level? For those suddenly unemployed, for
example, would they preserve or regain their environmental-demand-boosted abilities
sufficiently to demonstrate them in the next job interview or examination? There might
be suggested a danger that individuals used to the attentional boost derived from external
demands, once deprived of them, may be unable to regain a situation in which those
demands are available—may be unable to demonstrate competence in the very
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occupations or positions that provided them with that boost, because of inability to
demonstrate their former levels of cognitive competence.
In the event the primary hypothesis is not upheld, the place of rationality and
science in society is well-served by the debunking of an unfounded myth, especially one
such as this, which has made its way into established management theory.
Regardless of the outcome of the research, the data acquired would form a
contribution to accelerating research on cognitive capacity and performance under load, a
field receiving increasing attention in recent years (see the summary in Kirschner et al.,
2011). Additionally, a well-constructed study performs a useful social purpose—the
reinforcement of scientific research based upon curiosity, upon those moments when
someone says, “Now, that’s odd,” or “Why should that be?” In a society where
irrationality and unreason become increasingly powerful, reinforcing the foundations of
science is social change in itself.
Summary
It has long been suggested that “busy” people may be more efficient task
performers than others not so perceived. Conventional thinking on cognitive task
processing has contradicted that idea, holding instead that increased task load must
necessarily degrade cognitive performance. However, a thread of inconsistency runs
through cognitive research, with exceptions to the general rule appearing through the
years, as cognitive load appears to assist rather than inhibit or obstruct task performance.
In particular, recent work on multitasking and on performance under high cognitive load
has suggested that some individuals have abilities well beyond predicted cognitive
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performance under such circumstances, suggesting an ability to perform better than
others who are (theoretically) not so encumbered.
Alongside these apparent anomalies runs my interest in cognitive load occasioned
not by laboratory induction, but by environmental demands—dealing with a busy social
or work life, handling social interactions. Combining these two interests raises a question:
Is some of the apparent task overload in so-called “busy” people a means of using some
of the suggested advantages of high cognitive load? In effect, they would be using such
load to make themselves perform better, whether or not they were conscious or aware of
that.
As a first stage in exploring the possible phenomenon outlined above, I explored
whether any such advantage might be identified in people with an identifiable high level
of “busyness” in their daily lives. Chapter 1 outlined the development of the research
questions and hypotheses, and offered an outline of the theoretical background, including
historical hints at the existence of the deliberate use of cognitive load to increase the
efficiency of goal-oriented cognitive processing.
Chapter 2 comprises a comprehensive review of the literature on working
memory and cognitive load, expanding on gaps in the literature and theory. I then
consider, in greater detail, more recent work that shows the existence of performance
beyond prediction in other areas involving cognitive load and task performance. Chapter
3 contains descriptions of the research design and methodology, instruments, and data
analysis.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This review of the literature provides a brief overview of the concept of busyness,
which has been defined as “the environmental demands of day-to-day events with which
[persons] cope” (Martin & Park, 2003, p. 77), and offers a description of the positive and
negative effects of busyness on response to cognitive load. Working memory (WM) and
cognitive overload inform the theoretical framework of this study. Information on
intelligence as related to WM and attention span is also provided, along with information
on the impact of distraction on intelligence. A review of the literature on strategies and
instruments to measure WM and cognitive load is included, with a description of the
Martin and Parks Environmental Demands Questionnaire.
There are eight main sections within this review of the literature. Each section of
the literature review builds upon the next in order to better define the objectives of this
research study, which explored volitional busyness and cognitive efficiency. The first
describes WM primarily through the research of Baddeley (1992, 2000, 2001, 2003,
2011; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Bayliss, Jarrold, Gunn, & Baddeley, 2003) with support
from many others. The review also explores contemporary theoretical models of shortterm memory and WM. The next section defines WM’s role in cognitive load theory,
followed by a section on working memory capacity (WMC). A section on perceptual load
theory follows the discussion of WMC, describing the measurement of cognitive load and
defining automaticity. These sections provide a solid foundation for the subsequent
sections on busyness, volitional busyness, multitasking, and learned cognitive strategies.
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Keywords
Key terms used to search the literature included volitional busyness, theory of
cognitive overload, working memory, Parkinson’s law, busiest man, ask a busy man,
environmental busyness, busyness, cognitive busyness, cognitive control, cognitive
ability, cognitive processes, attention, attentional control, and perceptual load.
Literature Search Strategy
The literature compiled for this review was obtained through the use of
comprehensive online library search methods. A librarian was used for assistance in
determining the best search methodology and to help generate ideas regarding keywords
to search. Among the journal databases searched, those generating the most applicable
results were JSTOR, EBSCO, PubMed, Science Direct, Wiley, and Elsevier. A multitude
of other databases were also searched in the process. Prior to generating the returns, the
“peer reviewed” feature was selected, ensuring that all of the literature generated would
fit this designation.
I reviewed current literature containing empirical research in the relevant areas,
which appeared in a wide range of publications, from journals of general psychology
(American Psychologist), experimental psychology (Journal of Experimental Child
Psychology), and neuroscience (Neuropsychology) to journals on cognitive science
(Applied Cognitive Psychology, Cognition, Cognitive Neuropsychology, Intelligence) and
social psychology (Journal of Social Psychology, Journal of Applied Social Psychology,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology). Articles were identified through searches
conducted through the Walden University Library; through Google Scholar with a
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preference for peer-reviewed journals; and through Internet search engines such as
Google and Scirus, with a filter applied for peer-reviewed journals. Additionally, once
key authors had been identified in this way (e.g., Lavie, Baddeley, Sueller, Colom,
Engle), the corpus of their work was reviewed for other relevant research, and other
works cited by those authors were similarly reviewed. Similarly, I reviewed identified
journals for other relevant work, especially in specifically themed issues.
Working Memory (WM)
Within cognitive sciences, it is generally agreed that thinking—the consideration
of problems, issues, and the weighing and assessing of non-perceptual inputs—takes
place within a system known as working memory (Baddeley, 1981, 1992, 2001; Baddeley
& Hitch, 1974; Bayliss et al., 2003). The term itself is attributed by Baddeley (2003) to
Miller, Galanter and Pribram, and it was adopted by Baddeley and Hitch (1974) in their
proposal of the initial multicomponent model to differentiate between it and the earlier
models based on short-term memory (STM). More than 40 years later, the model has seen
significant development, through the significant revision offered by Baddeley (2001) and
continuing work since (e.g., Baddeley, 2003, 2011; Barrouillet et al., 2007; Colom et al.,
2004; Cowan et al., 2008; Süß et al., 2002). Over three decades of contributing research,
the term went through several varying and inconsistent permutations before being defined
as referring to the system or systems involved in the temporary maintenance and
manipulation of information (Baddeley, 2001; McCabe, Roediger, McDaniel, Balota, &
Hambrick, 2010).
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Working Memory Models
While the basic WM concept was broadly accepted early on, Barrett, Tugade, and
Engle (2004) noted that there was little initial agreement on the definition or even
components of the model. For example, Colom and Shih (2004) asserted strongly that
WM was simply a storage facility, although comprising “a highly integrated ensemble of
cognitive functions” (Colom, Shih, Flores-Mendoza, & Quiroga, 2006, p. 811). Opinion
was sharply divided on the issue, with other studies (Mackintosh & Bennett, 2003; Shah
& Miyake, 1996) suggesting at least partial fractionation. However, there was broad
agreement upon certain characteristics of the conceptualized WM system. Particularly, it
was seen to play a central role in controlling attention—balancing the various calls upon
working memory capacity (WMC) at any given moment—and integrating calls and
information transfer between inputs, short-term memory, and long-term memory (LTM;
Oberauer & Hein, 2012; Paas & Sweller, 2012). There were, however, competing schools
of thought on WM structure and function, offering different theoretical models on how
WM functions (Logie, 2011).
Unitary Model
The earliest modern theories of STM were rooted in the observation that when
humans are presented with a series of items to be recalled, they are able to recall very few
of them (Sperling, 1960). As implied by the terminology, such iconic memory (Neisser,
as cited in Gegenfurtner & Sperling, 1993) was considered to be based on visual imagery
and considered to have only a very small capacity—typically, about four items—for only
a short time (Cowan, 2001; Sperling, 1960; Zhang & Luck, 2011). Experiments involving
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the short-duration display and subsequent recall of visual data suggested that information
was held in memory only for a small fraction of a second (di Lollo & Dixon, 1988). The
hypothetical area of STM responsible for immediate processing of data was known as the
short-term store and was also theorized to be the controller and allocator of memory
resources for processing of immediate data such as speech and the transfer of information
into LTM (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Atkinson & Shiffrin, as cited in Baddeley & Hitch,
1974) . This era saw the beginnings of the conceptualization of WM as a system
containing various stores and working modules, with a central coordinating system
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).
The Three-Component Model
In a summary of the state of research and theory on WM, Baddeley (1981)
pointed out the limitations of a theory based purely on a single STM store, noting
research demonstrating its lack of predictive value. Baddeley (1981) noted particularly
Baddeley and Hitch’s (1974) prediction that in a unitary system with limited capacity,
once the memory being used for both storage and processing is moderately challenged by
simultaneous processing and storage tasks, performance should be impaired. This was
indeed demonstrated, with reasoning speed and item recall both adversely affected by the
introduction of two or more additional items into STM (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).
However, the noted effect was far from that expected by the researchers. In what might
be seen as foreshadowing many such results to follow (e.g., Jaeggi et al., 2007; Watson &
Strayer, 2010), while the researchers expected the “near-span digit load ... should have
almost totally occupied STM,” it failed to do so (Baddeley, 1981, p. 17). The effect was
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so far from predictions that it led Baddeley and Hitch to a revised conceptualization of
the mechanisms of WM, which has since come to form the basis of models of WM—
even of those apparently in contest with it (Baddeley, 1981, 2003; Baddeley & Hitch,
1974). Baddeley and Hitch described a structure that included not just a single short-term
memory but two—one handling essentially auditory or language-based information (the
phonological loop) and one handling essentially visual or spatially-based information (the
visuo-spatial scratch pad). These two data stores were seen to be administered by a
central executive, which combined elements of a verbal memory store and a controller—
essentially, an administrator and allocator—of attentional resources.
Such a model would accord with Gilbert and Osborne’s later (1989) general
observations on cognitive deterioration under load, which implicitly allowed for a
simultaneous-processing or resource-sharing model: “When people do too many things at
once, they often do some of them badly…” (p. 946). Clearly, while the effect of cognitive
load (described by Gilbert and Osborne as “cognitive busyness” [1989, p. 940]) on
cognitive processing was becoming substantiated by research, there were some
exceptions to the expected degradation. Gilbert and Osborne expanded on this with a
number of observations on responses and reactions to cognitive busyness, including
automatic process responses.
By extension to the three-component theory, and as similarly theorized with the
unitary model, once the “pool” limit of WM was reached, probably at four or more items
(Cowan, 2001), there would be no resources left for any other processing. As such, when
too many calls were made on attention simultaneously—increasing cognitive load—WM
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should reach its capacity and become unable to allocate more resources to some tasks
(Wickens, as cited in Watson & Strayer, 2010). However, and once again, experiments
conducted by Jaeggi et al. (2007) found that when considered as a group, participants’
WM was affected as predicted by Wickens, yet there were individuals able to maintain
WM and attention-related tasks beyond predicted capacity limits.
Such inconsistencies between predictions and observations were noted by
Kirschner, Ayres, and Chandler (2011). In their survey of the present state of knowledge
on cognitive load, they noted the continuing dearth of consistent and replicated research
in the area. Notably, they drew attention to a lack of correlation between reported
cognitive load and associated measures of performance—implying, however, the effect
was attributable to a measurement or reporting issue. They noted strongly that there were
multiple such inconsistencies and little follow-up.
Multiple-Component Model
The introduction of more sophisticated WM testing techniques offered evidence
to challenge and expand upon the three-component model (Baddeley, 1992, 2003; Duff &
Logie, 2001; Logie, 2011; Towse, Hitch, & Hutton, 1998). Like the three-component
model, the multiple resource-sharing model conceived of WM as including the executive
functions that control allocation of resources. However, it considered that such resources
were not shared but rather apportioned and allocated uniquely to a number of associated
mechanisms, such as those handling auditory and visual neuro-processing. In effect, it
considers WM as a structured workspace with a number of more-or-less discrete
components, such as language, visual, and episodic memory, each with their own
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resources. Logie (2011) commented that the attention-control functions of WM were not
seen in this paradigm as standing alone, allocating a pool of resources as needed. Rather,
they resided within a group of subsystems, each with its own part to play in storing and
processing different types of stimuli and inputs.
Controlled-Attention Model
Essentially, this model emphasized the role of the central executive in Baddeley’s
(1981) model, such that it became the key component in a system for controlling and
focusing attention (Cowan, 1988, 1999; Engle, 2002; Oberauer & Hein, 2012). Baddeley
specifically noted that this was essentially “a different emphasis, but not in any
fundamental sense incompatible with a multi-component model” (Baddeley, 2003, p.
837, referring to Cowan, 1999).
In a review of the state of knowledge and research on working memory, Logie
(2011) asserted the two main strands of thought to be the multiple-component and the
controlled-attention models, standing as theoretical equals. In research practice, the
primary difference between the competing theories of resource-sharing and multiple
resource-sharing would be the differing questions raised on working memory, and
conversely, the effect on choice of research designs and data collection methods. The
research questions will tend to guide the preference for one theory or the other as a
theoretical basis for the research at hand (Logie, 2011; Roberts, Beh, & Stankov, 2002).
For example, the multiple-component theory is little affected by considerations of WMC,
because it is concerned with processing speed and strategies, whereas the controlled-
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attention theory lends itself to a focus on individual differences in working-memory
capacity and capabilities (Logie, 2011).
Working Memory Capacity
Under cognitive load theory, working memory capacity was believed to be strictly
limited (Buschman, Siegel, Roy, & Miller, 2011; Cowan, 2001; Cowan et al., 2005,
2008; Paas, Tuovinen, Tabbers, & Van Gerven, 2003; Zhang & Luck, 2011). The
limitation is not simply a theoretical, technical issue; researchers have tested the limits of
WMC and sought to measure and predict the various demands and factors that will cause
that limit to be reached (Buschman et al., 2011). Some researchers suggested that the
limits of WMC may be taken as synonymous with limits on attention (Engle, 2002;
Kyllonen & Christal, 1990).
One assumption of working memory capacity has been that people are limited by
a limited WM in how many cognitive tasks they can perform. Past research into WM
suggested that there was a rule of seven information elements, plus or minus two
elements, that a human could hold (Miller, 1956). Cowan (2001) disagreed, noting that
many researchers have suggested a significantly smaller limit of about four information
elements. And yet WM is not limited simply by raw “capacity,” as though it were
computer RAM (Cowan, 2001). Jaeggi et al. (2007) noted performance on WM-based
tasks well in excess of predicted capabilities, to the extent that the experimental goal of
loading participants past their WM limits was not achieved in some cases.
Sweller (2006) suggested that because the processing of new information contains
such a significant random element—the “trying-out” of randomly generated alternative
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implications of the new data—WMC was necessarily limited as an evolutionary
protective factor. By implication, a restricted WM prevented the possibility of large-scale
corruption in the personal cognitive structure by limiting the amount of information that
may be affected by the necessary “randomness” involved in the acquisition of the new
information (Sweller, 2006). By contrast, Watson and Strayer (2010) indicated that
changing environmental demands—less physical and more cognitive, and including the
effects of technology—may be favoring the supertasker’s abilities. These evolutionary
advantages have yet to spread to the general populace, however, as evolutionary
processes are restricted to generational time constraints. Other factors, however, may
serve to enhance WM, apparently overcoming some of the restrictions.
Effectiveness of Filtering Heuristics
Vogel, McCullough, and Machizawa (2005) demonstrated that the key to
effective memory use is rejection and filtering heuristics. Subjects with “high capacity”
memory were more efficient at sorting out what needed to enter WM and what might be
excluded as irrelevant. Vogel et al. (2005) noted that subjects with apparent lower WMC
may actually be storing more data than “necessary,” which might have been rejected by a
more efficient mechanism. Gazzaley and Nobre (2012) indicated that fMRI data showed
a filtering of information to prevent overloading, which tends to support Vogel et al.
(2005). Cowan (1988) even suggested that such “filtering” might take preawareness—
before certain data even reached the area of activated memory known as the focus of
attention such that monitoring of inputs not deemed immediately relevant would be
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outside awareness, yet could be brought into awareness under certain “trigger”
conditions.
Working Memory Training
Researchers have demonstrated that executive control may be strengthened
through training of WM (Houben, Wiers, & Jansen, 2011; Klingberg, 2010). The specific
implication was that improving WM would improve attentional control and reduce
distraction, or at least improve the handling of low perceptual load (Lavie, 1995). Jaeggi
et al. (2007) noted that following WM training, as with training on other high-end
cognitive tasks, there was decreased activation in certain regions of the brain where high
activation was associated with lower task performance.
Support for this conclusion was drawn from research (Coubard et al., 2011;
Darowski et al., 2008; Milham et al., 2002) suggesting that much of the apparent
cognitive decline in older people was actually a weakening of executive function—the
“filter mechanism” that sorts and excludes the relevant, the irrelevant and the merely
distracting from attention, and thus from processing through WM. (Perhaps too this is
associated with decreasing ability to prioritize processing on certain data streams—as
noted in Cowan’s Habituation Hypothesis of Selective Attention [1988]—leaving them
below awareness unless or until activated.) Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, and Conway
(1999) concurred, equating both WM capacity and fluid intelligence with “the ability to
keep a representation active, particularly in the face of interference and distraction” (p.
309). Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, and Viding (2004), also concurring with such a weakening
in executive function, noted older people demonstrated a reduced capacity for processing
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perceptual stimuli, such that they were able more readily to resist distractive perceptual
stimuli (lower threshold for perceptual overload). This tended to at least partially
compensate for reduced cognitive capacity that would tend to decrease ability to resist
such distractors (Lavie et al., 2004).
Modality Effect
A significant amount of cognitive load theory and research is derived from, and
related primarily to, the effect of cognitive load on learning. Indeed, the term cognitive
load is typically attributed to Sweller (1988), in his study on problem-solving and
learning. Much of the research in this area is concerned with the process of information
acquisition, processing, and storage (Kirschner et al., 2011). As such, little of that work is
directly applicable to a work such as this, which is dealing with processing of real-time
tasks--with one very large and notable exception.
Baddeley (1981) reported on unpublished research that required an additional task
to be performed simultaneously with a main task. Where the tasks were of a different
nature—verbal and reasoning—the additional cognitive load did not impact performance
of the main task until it reached quite a high level of cognitive load. This added weight to
the assertion of separate WM elements, each with their own resources (Baddeley, 1981).
Accordingly, dividing the presentation of information between such channels serves
effectively to increase working memory beyond the innate capacity of the individual
(Kalyuga, Chandler, & Sweller, 1999). This modality effect has been the subject of a
considerable amount of research, and has indeed been shown to improve effective WM
capacity (Kalyuga et al., 1999). The apparent paradox bears pointing out: Adding
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additional cognitive load improves overall cognitive capacity. The reverse is also
supported; presenting information redundantly, in a manner calculated to force
reconciliation of the different data “channels,” degrades effective working memory
capacity (Kalyuga et al., 1999; Spanjers, van Gog, & van Merriënboer, 2012; Van
Merrienboer & Sweller, 2010).
In an echo of the modality effect, Kim, Kim, and Chun (2005) noted that
cognitive load reduced distraction. Contrary to prevailing theory, they asserted, the
addition of load may improve processing efficiency, but it is dependent upon the type of
load. However, the importance of WM in this process has been challenged. Oberauer,
Lange, and Engle (2004) conducted research that did not support the earlier contention
that WMC may be equated with an ability to resist distraction. They further concluded
that WM was also not related to any special facility or skill in executive function, such as
partitioning attention between task-demands.
Individual Differences
Using the metaphor of a digital camera, Cowan (2001) suggested that while each
individual may store only three or four “images,” or features, in WM, that there was a
“resolution” fixed for each individual, and differences in the “resolution” and number of
features stored. Zhang and Luck (2011) then suggested the possibility of actual innate
differences in WM between individuals. Such individuals with the ability to store more
features had a significant advantage in problem-solving—perhaps through holding more
ideas to add to the mix—in object permanence and image rotation.
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This accords with other views on the importance of looking at individual
differences between research participants, particularly the differences in executive
function and attention capture (Engle & Kane, 2003). Vogel et al. (2005) noted that
individual differences in filtering of irrelevant information account for much of the
observed variation in WMC. Jaeggi et al. (2007) also noted two defining characteristics
even of their arbitrarily-selected group of “high-performing participants” (p. 75—selected
at the median of scores on a challenging n-back test.) One was individual capacity: These
participants, able to function better than predictions under very high cognitive load, used
fewer cognitive strategies for their tasks, and were more likely to rely on “intuition” or
automatic processes than were lower performers, who were likely to switch between
multiple strategies and did not rely upon “intuition” at all (Jaeggi et al., 2007). The
second important characteristic was simply intent to succeed at the task, suggesting a
degree of self-efficacy—the belief or experience that one will be able to succeed, or at
least have sufficient chance of doing so. Such an association between the experience of
self-efficacy and the ability to function under increased cognitive load was also noted by
Gazzalay and Nobre (2012). Elsewhere, the scope of such individual differences has been
found to include individuals with cognitive abilities previously declared impossible.
Watson and Strayer (2010) found a very small percentage of people able to perform dual
task operations without experiencing a decrease in performance—“supertaskers” (p. 481).
Other studies have also shown that such performance beyond predictions is possible on
an individual basis even where study participants in aggregate showed a decrease in
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performance (Hoffmann et al., 2013; Jaeggi et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2005) . The lack of
information pertaining to these high performers has demonstrated a gap in the literature.
Theoretical Aspects of Effect of Cognitive Load on Cognitive Processing
According to the modality effect on learning (Kalyuga et al., 1999), as cognitive
load increases, the three elements of WM loading—intrinsic, extrinsic and germane—are
involved in task- or problem-specific functions, allocating memory elements to the next
input or task. When the WM limit is reached—generally when four or more sustained
representations would be required (Cowan, 2001)—then processes not already allocated
WM will be deprived of it, while active processes will have the existing allocation
reduced (Buschman et al., 2011). Thus, the evident effect of cognitive load is to reduce
the amount of WM available for the performance of cognitive processes. Cowan (2001)
noted the debate over whether such limits were real or apparent; that is, whether they
relate mainly to image decay in STM (Engle et al., 1999), to a decreased ability to handle
distraction (Lavie, 2010; Lavie et al., 2004), or to the re-allocation of restricted
attentional resources (Barrett et al., 2004; Fitousi & Wenger, 2011). Regardless of the
debate on the underlying mechanism, the noted effect was accepted—the introduction of
additional cognitive tasks eventually results in deterioration in performance, in either a
new or existing task (Fitousi & Wenger, 2011). The uncertainty over the mechanism,
however, is consistent with complaints and concerns that this area of cognitive science
remains inadequately supported (Fitousi & Wenger, 2011; Kirschner et al., 2011). These
studies have shown a need for further research.
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It should also be noted that other researchers (Sweller, 1988, 2006) speculated it
may be likely more complex problems increase cognitive load, so taking up WMC and
reducing problem-solving ability. Sweller (1988) described such interference between
problem-solving and learning under conditions of high cognitive load as “inevitable” (p.
275). Given the noted relationship between WMC and general intelligence (Süß et al.,
2002), it is not then unreasonable to equate increases and decreases in effective WM
capacity with apparent corresponding changes in general intelligence or problem-solving
ability.
Automaticity in Processes
It was noted over a century ago that it was possible by overtraining to gain the
ability to carry out a cognitively demanding task simultaneously with other similarly
demanding tasks without degradation in the primary task. The classic example was that of
telegraph operators (Bryan & Harter, 1897). Effectively, with training and experience the
operator gains the facility to force performance of the primary task below conscious
awareness, suggesting that it was awareness, or attention paid to the task, that required
most cognitive processing. With such operations performed with a high degree of
automaticity, cognitive capacity is freed for the more cognitively demanding and
consciously processed tasks (Gilbert & Osborne, 1989). Gilbert and Osborne (1989)
concluded that those demands or processes closest to automaticity were the least
demanding on resources.
Clearly, too, the switch into unconscious operation is itself automatic, prompted
by nothing more than the introduction of a more cognitively demanding task, such as a

35
conversation or other similar interaction, or simply a “trigger” to which the individual has
become sensitized or habituated (Bryan & Harter, 1897; Cowan, 1988; Jaeggi et al.,
2007). By implication, then, the overtrained individual gained not just the facility to
perform an otherwise cognitively demanding task with little conscious processing, but
also to switch the task automatically into that mode of processing in response to a
situational demand, without the need to learn a cognitive technique for making that
switch.
Distribution of available resources. When WM is subjected to multiple,
simultaneous cognitive demands, those processes demanding most resources are shut
down. Gilbert and Osborne (1989) used the term “failure” to describe this process.
However, their characterization of this process could readily be re-framed to see it as
advantageous to the performance of the other processes at hand: as a re-distribution of
available resources, in fact, to run as many simultaneous tasks as possible.
Perceptual Load Theory
Alongside the cognitively driven system that draws directly from WM is another
set of demands — that of awareness of external stimuli, and filtering into or away from
perception. Lavie (1995) proposed that this mechanism functions alongside the element
of WM that controls and focuses attention, while at the same time pulling from the same
pool of WM and cognitive capacity. This perceptual load theory (Lavie, 1995) defined
perceptual load as the demand imposed by stimuli, such as sensory data, while cognitive
load then became the load imposed by the processing of object-based data. Under this
theory, high levels of perceptual load reduce (or eliminate) the ability to process
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distracting stimuli, leaving attentional resources free to deal with goal-directed stimuli
(Lavie, 1995). Conversely, high levels of cognitive load reduce the executive (attentional)
control capacity required for continued suppression of processing of distracting stimuli.
Perceptual processing efficiency thus decreased in the presence of both distraction and
high cognitive load.
Under situations of high perceptual load, study participants have experienced
selective attention—the reduction or restriction of the ability to recognize or process
extraneous distractions—which has also been termed inattentional blindness (Lavie,
2010; Simons, 2007; Simons & Chabris, 1999). At a certain point, stimuli that would
distract the individual from the task at hand are simply removed from awareness—that is,
no longer granted cognitive resources—leaving newly-available capacity to process
essential perceptual inputs (Gazzaley & Nobre, 2012; Simons, 2007; Simons & Chabris,
1999). The phenomenon is well-known, having been recorded as early as 1907 but more
extensively studied since about 1975 onwards (Simons & Chabris, 1999). Perhaps the
best-known demonstration is the “Invisible Gorilla,” where participants are invited to
count passes being made between two basketball teams, and are subsequently shown to
be so focused upon the primary task they fail to observe a person in a gorilla suit walking
on the court (Simons & Chabris, 1999). More practically, experts who are offered
distractor images during a search for specific image types and sizes may filter them out of
perception. In one case, radiologists looking for nodules on CT scans missed the image of
a gorilla inserted into the scans, at a scale almost 50x the size of the average nodule
(Drew, Võ, & Wolfe, 2013). The researchers wrote this up in a regretful tone, as “even
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experts suffer from inattentional blindness.” To me, it would show that the experts had
developed appropriate and effective heuristic filters, keeping them focused on the task at
hand. The observation that the phenomenon may not be consciously perceived but may
still pass into a “perception schema” at some level (Simons & Chabris, 1999) accords
well with Gilbert and Osborne’s (1989) observations on delayed processing.
Perceptual load theory is antithetical to the basic hypothesis of the present
proposal, in its assertion that WM load on its own has not been shown to lead to
inattentional blindness. However, it has suggested an alternative possibility—that under
conditions of high distraction from non-goal-related stimuli, at a certain threshold,
processing and conscious attention paid to such stimuli is relegated below awareness, and
attentional resources shifted towards goal-relevant stimuli. While perceptual load may
interfere with or block the processing of non-goal-directed stimuli (distractors), it is a
function of higher cognitive control mechanisms to maintain the low priority being given
to processing such distractors (Lavie et al., 2004). In conditions of high cognitive load,
Lavie et al.(2004) argued that resources required for the effective maintenance of such
control are not available. In consequence, the reduction in the influence of distractors, an
effect of high perceptual load, would be undermined by the absence of effective
reinforcement and support from cognitive (attentional) control processes (Lavie et al.,
2004). So, if it is believed that the “busiest man” is “loaded” not so much by cognitive
tasks (reasoning and thinking, etc.) as by perceptual inputs, then cognitive load theory
certainly supports the divestment of excess input—and thus the freeing of “processing”
capacity and implicitly increased focus—after a certain point.
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The phenomenon of inattentional blindness may be such that it positively affects
performance. However, according to Dutt (2007), cognitive performance decreased
during real-world tasks imposing high cognitive load, regardless of the level of
perceptual load. The contrast between the conclusions reached in Lavie et al. (2004) and
Dutt (2007)—the latter essentially a review of Lavie et al. (2004)—was notable. Dutt
used different tests, real-world versus computer-based, and different levels of extraneous
distractors (Dutt, 2007). Dutt’s conclusion, discounting any effect of high perceptual load
on the impact of high cognitive load on performance, contrasts strongly not only with
Lavie et al. but also with DeLeeuw (2009), who suggested that an “optimal level” of
cognitive load “insulates against distractors” (p. 67) and could be mistaken for
inattentional blindness. Much like wave frequencies coming together and cancelling the
effects of each other, high extraneous (cognitive) load and distractors functioned to
maintain focus, as opposed to high perceptual load having that effect (DeLeeuw, 2009)—
which is also a partial statement of my own research hypothesis.
Vehicle drivers exemplify this phenomenon very well, as noted by Lavie (2010),
because of the high degree of focus required to drive a vehicle and block out extraneous
information, whether it be from inside the vehicle or outside. Lavie observed that during
periods of high perceptual load, drivers were often unable to differentiate between the
irrelevant distractors and those that were relevant, such as traffic lights, pedestrians, and
motorcycles. This accords with other research where combined high perceptual load and
high cognitive load predicted lower levels of performance for participants in real-world
studies (Watson & Strayer, 2010).
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Busyness
Although the state of being busy has often been described, finding a generally
accepted definition of busyness has remained a challenge. The concept has had a long
history, carrying the implication that it is a state of being rather than a phase or a
transitory period of high task load (Ray, 1768). Originally described by Gilbert and
Osborne (1989), the concept of cognitive busyness was expanded by Lieberman (2000)
who described it as the “effects on task A when WM is being used to complete task B”
(p. 484). Such effects were found to include reduced function in areas such as reasoning
ability (Gilhooly, Logie & Wynn as cited in Mackintosh & Bennett, 2003), decisionmaking (Ferrari & Dovidio, 2001; Roberts, Beh & Stankov as cited in Mackintosh &
Bennett, 2003), and the ability to commit information to long term memory (Whitbourne,
2005; Whitbourne et al., 2008). Kirschner, Ayres and Chandler (2011) noted studies
showing degradation of decision-making and the negative effect of extraneous load on
learning outcomes. Große and Renkl (2006) and Sweller (1988) observed that offering
too many solutions to a problem may so tax WM as to leave insufficient capacity to
assess and weigh alternative solutions. In general, research suggested cognitively busy
people demonstrate reduced performance on non‐core, non‐routine cognitive activities
such as:
•

keeping up appearances at odds with reality (Pontari & Schlenker, 2000),
where incongruent self-presentations under cognitive load were notably
affected in ways that suggested WM processes were being hindered by the
imposed cognitive load;
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•

inhibition of stereotypical judgments (Kulik, Perry, & Bourhis, 2000; Perry,
Kulik, & Bourhis, 1996);

•

analyzing situational data and cues and making nuanced decisions and
judgments (Ferrari & Dovidio, 2001);

•

reconciling or correcting inconsistent information (Hutter & Crisp, 2006);

•

inhibiting or interfering with self-control; e.g., cognitive load may inhibit the
ability of trait overeaters to restrain their eating (Ward & Mann, 2000), while
conversely, strengthening WM through training improves ability to refrain
from alcohol abuse (Houben et al., 2011);

•

writing to LTM—i.e., schema creation—and then retrieving data, using the
efficiency of retrieval from LTM rather than trying to process in WM alone
(Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003; Kirschner et al., 2011; Sweller,
1988).

Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull (1988) offered the explanation that people exhibiting
the effects of cognitive load may simply be “too busy” to use data they are gathering
from and about their environment and context. Gilbert and Osborne (1989) noted
particularly that those tasks involving interpersonal contact made a notably heavy
demand upon cognitive resources. However, assessing the size or nature of the effect of
cognitive busyness (i.e., cognitive load) is not an easy matter. In recent years, with
changing definitions and understanding of cognitive load, it has been noted that existing
measures of cognitive load have been found to be increasingly unreliable (Kirschner et
al., 2011; van Gog & Paas, 2008). Paas and Sweller (2012) also noted that performance
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test results failed to have a direct correlation with subjective measures of cognitive load.
Difficulties in assessing or measuring cognitive load may be imputed from the noted
practice of assuming that an individual’s self-report of task difficulty is sufficient for the
purposes of a study of performance involving such load (Kirschner et al., 2011; Paas &
Sweller, 2012; Paas et al., 2003). Given the fragmentation of theory in this area, the likely
validity of this approach may be limited in application, but alternatives required more
specific and sensitive instruments.
Nevertheless, the most familiar dictionary definition of busyness, “occupied with
activities,” still does not convey the essence of the quality or trait, which seems easier to
observe than define. Some researchers (Martin & Park, 2003) have recommended
busyness be defined as the extent of being encumbered with tasks. Others expanded the
field of view to suggest busyness was the state of being subject to multiple demands that
may include social interaction (Milgram, 1970; Segal & McCauley, 1986), and still
others asserted busyness was a state of mind, arising from the condition of dealing with
multiple simultaneous cognitive demands (Gilbert & Osborne, 1989). Among the many
descriptions and forms of busyness are
•

busy people have “significantly less free time, less frequency of contacts with
friends, less time for physical training…” (Šlachtová, Tomášková, &
Šplíchalová, 2003, p. 88);

•

busyness is implicitly the condition of being busy with “productive” work, as
with Parkinson’s “busy man” (Parkinson, 1957, p. 2) compared with his
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stereotypical “lady of leisure” (Parkinson, 1957, p. 2) whose time is taken up
with “non-productive” tasks;
•

busyness is “the density or pace of daily events to which an individual
attends” (Martin & Park, 2003, p. 77), with specific regard to the “density of
obligations” (Martin & Park, 2003, p. 78);

•

busyness is a “mental state” that outside the laboratory is the product of “the
many resource-consuming tasks of ordinary life” (Gilbert & Osborne, 1989, p.
940), that may include social interaction.

For the purposes of the current investigation, busyness is described as an
observable state associated with multiple calls upon cognitive resources, such as
occasioned by undertaking multiple tasks or interactions requiring cognitive resources.
Hoffman et al. (2013) indicated that when higher demands were placed upon cognitive
load, the cognitive load shifted to a less taxing strategy, which increased performance.
Participants were able to ignore distractions while completing the task, which coincided
with other research in the field. It follows that people have developed strategies to filter
the daily distractions in life while completing tasks.
Measuring Busyness
Concerned with the daily lives of the elderly, and the possibility in particular
those demands might interfere with the ability to adhere to a medication regime, Martin
and Park (2003) created an instrument to measure busyness. The Martin and Park
Environmental Demands Questionnaire (MPEDQ) was developed to assess:
•

Self-reported busyness in daily life,
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•

The degree to which a respondent follows a structured daily routine,

•

The degree to which a person’s life and time are preoccupied with attempting
to complete tasks, and

•

The degree to which the tasks remain unfinished.

The instrument poses a total 13 questions on busyness, task-completion, and daily
routines, to be answered on a five-point Likert scale. It generates scale data on two
independent factors, described by Martin and Park (2003) as Busyness and Routine.
Routine is defined as “the predictability or routinization of events independent of
density” (Martin & Park, 2003, p. 77). As noted by Martin and Park, they designed the
instrument to differentiate between behavior driven by varying or nonconstant taskdemands and that driven by established routines. It was also noted that the different
demands and routines could reflect very different lifestyles and daily existences.
In the process leading to the development of the MPEDQ, Martin and Park (2003)
noted and examined other measures of busyness, predominantly based upon self-reported
task-difficulty, and in some cases upon physiological indicators (Paas et al., 2003).
Cognitive load theory required busyness measurements as part of the refinement of the
process and the materials, typically using self-reporting and physiological indicators of
task difficulty. In the case being considered by Martin and Park (2003), the load to be
measured was not the load occasioned by tasks, but the prior load—which could be
considered a state, or ground of being—in advance of the subject’s engagement with a
specific task. However, instruments assessing task difficulty were designed to measure
specific task-based performance and effort, usually as part of the teaching/learning
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process. In creating their own instrument, Martin and Park (2003) were following the
conceptual lead of Gilbert and Osborne (1989), who asserted that the term busyness was
descriptive of “a mental state rather than the activity that gives rise to that state” (p. 940).
Gilbert and Osborne added that the multiple demands on cognitive capacity, of which
busyness was the product, could take many forms, and the product of busyness, being the
state of responding to an environment high in demands, was simply cognitive load.
Gilbert and collaborators coined the term cognitive busyness (Gilbert & Osborne, 1989,
p. 940; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988, p. 733) and used it from that point forward to
describe cognitive load, reflecting the implicit connection between the mental state and
its effects. Blumenthal (2002) also used the terms cognitive load and cognitive busyness
interchangeably.
Effects of busyness on cognitive processes. The existence of busyness as a state
of being is an old suggestion (Gutierrez & Kouvelis, 1991; Parkinson, 1957; Payn, 1884;
Smiles, 1866). By the tenets of evolutionary psychology, the state of being extremely
busy would not continue in the absence of some advantage (A. S. Miller & Kanazawa,
2007). However, researchers have expressed concern over the possible deleterious effects
of being “too busy.” Martin and Park (2002, for example reported that optimal cognitive
efficiency was not generally associated with busyness. Numerous other researchers have
demonstrated negative consequences associated with cognitive overload, such as WM
degradation and reduced processing efficiency (Kirschner et al., 2011; Paas et al., 2003).
Mackintosh and Bennett (2003) suggested that cognitive load deteriorates performance
on cognitive tasks; however, they noted that the observed effects will often depend upon
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the model of WM the researcher is evaluating. Still other researchers demonstrated that it
is not possible to perform more than one cognitive task at once with any degree of
efficiency, and that performance of any such task performed concurrently with another
must be degraded (Dux et al., 2009; Dux, Ivanoff, Asplund, & Marois, 2006; Gilbert &
Osborne, 1989; Pashler, 1994).
By contrast, other researchers demonstrated that under high cognitive load, some
people are able to display strategies improving focus upon a task at hand (Kulik et al.,
2000; Pontari & Schlenker, 2000; Silvera, 1995; Sternberg & Mio, 2008; Watson &
Strayer, 2010). Still other researchers demonstrated that performance of some tasks under
high cognitive load may not degrade to the degree predicted (Baddeley, 1992), may not
apparently be affected at all (Bryan & Harter, 1897), and may even be improved
(Sweller, 2006). Such improvements in focus or processing efficiency have been
purported to occur as a function of intelligence.
Busyness, Intelligence, and Problem-Solving
Chi, Glaser, and Rees (1981) stated unequivocally that the three key components
of cognitive performance were speed of processing, memory span, and the use of
complex strategies, and that greater intelligence was associated with greater capacity in
all three. “More intelligent individuals have faster processing speed, longer memory span,
and use more sophisticated strategies than less intelligent persons” (Chi et al., 1981, p. 7).
At least one strand of thought suggested that WMC (available capacity) moderated the
ability to learn unfamiliar information by slowing down the process of identifying its
implications and committing only those considered “valid” into LTM (Sweller, 2006).
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Conversely, the availability of information in LTM greatly increased problem-solving
speed, when compared to individuals working with completely new information, as
WMC does not restrict the processing of data already in LTM (Hambrick & Engle, 2002;
Sweller, 2006). If the issue at hand is problem-solving skills, and conveyed in terms of
existing knowledge rather than processing speed and practice effects, an increase in
memory span or processing speed might be perceived and measured as an increase in
intelligence (Baddeley, 2003; Daneman & Merikle, 1996).
It is further proposed by some researchers that the overlap between WM and g
(measure of fluid intelligence) may be regarded as a single construct (Colom et al., 2004).
Others disagreed in various ways. Hambrick and Engle (2002) stated that prior
knowledge in the area in question was a major influence, while noting that WMC was an
important factor in performance on memory-based tasks. According to Kaufman,
DeYoung, Gray, Brown, and Mackintosh (2009), WM is a component of g but so too are
processing speed and associative learning. Because of those additional components, they
suggested intelligence as a single construct of WM could be disregarded (Kaufman et al.,
2009).
Volitional Busyness
If cognitive busyness is to be in any aspect a learned or adopted behavior or
condition, then a differentiation must be drawn between busyness that arises from matters
outside the immediate control of the individual, and that which is a strategy adopted by
the individual. In this context, the term volitional busyness is adopted, describing that
element that arises from decisions or autonomous actions of the individual. There is a
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strong implication in the definition of the two scales generated by the MPEDQ—being
respectively Busyness and Routine—that there is a difference to be drawn (Martin &
Park, 2003). Here Busyness is, by implication, the task-loading adopted by the individual,
while Routine is the structural element that forms part of the daily routine of the
individual. In order to enhance the differentiation, this author further suggested a variable
may be derived from the difference between the two ratings for any individual, which
may be considered a measure of Volitional Busyness. However, to allow for the
possibility that Busyness alone may be the influencing factor, the research analysis
considered Busyness and Routine as co-equal independent variables.
Multiple researchers have noted that cognitively busy subjects tend to adapt to
their condition. Just as perceptual load theory stated that perceptually busy subjects
simply ceased perceiving non-goal-directed stimuli (Lavie, 2010), so cognitively busy
subjects may be able, despite their cognitive preoccupation, to develop a perception of
their own cognitive busyness and accommodate to it, or even to adapt unconsciously to
eliminate non-goal tasks from processing (e.g., inattentional blindness). Silvera, for
example, noted that individuals given a choice of experimental test to perform were more
likely to choose the easiest (1995). The defining quality of the response to cognitive
overload—the excess of stimulation or demands upon an already cognitivelybusy
person—may be simplification, including choosing simpler alternatives or strategies
(Hoffmann et al., 2013; Jaeggi et al., 2007; Silvera, 1995).
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Restricting the Awareness and Processing of External Information
In situations of high cognitive load, both perceptual and cognitive information
may be received but not processed (Gilbert et al., as cited in Gilbert & Osborne, 1989).
Whitbourne (2005) noted memory failures in younger adults on the day following a busy
day, suggesting that perhaps they either did not absorb data from that day, or alternatively
reprocess existing data for use the following day. For the latter, Gilbert and Osborne
(1989) noted, “busy subjects … made less complex representations of the target than did
not‐busy subjects” (Footnotes, para. 2).
Unconscious data gathering and delayed processing. Gilbert and Osborne
(1989) noted that data may be held below perception, recalled and processed later, after
cognitive load diminished to a level below “busyness.” A controlled, or at least
programmed, cognitive process of resource-sharing has thus evolved to make most
efficient use of available memory without actually losing data. Subsequently, other
researchers have made allied observations tending to support the idea that less-automatic
processes are placed on hold when cognitive busyness is high (e.g., inattentional
blindness), enhancing the cognitive efficiency of the immediate transaction (CartwrightFinch & Lavie, 2007).
Gilbert and Osborne (1989) noted that although “busy perceivers” are unable to
use information they have collected, information recall is not affected (Experiment1,
para. 1; see also Cowan, 1988). That being the case, it is likely cognitively busy people
are less able to devote processing resources to respond to distractions outside the task(s)
in which they are engaged, and as such may perform tasks with greater focus because
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they are less easily distracted by extraneous data, not just stimuli (Gilbert & Osborne,
1989; see also Cowan, 1988). WM capacity may indeed be seen as primarily an issue of
attentional control, as suggested by Gilbert, Krull, et al. (1988)—that is, moderating the
amount of expertise or previous experience a person had in the particular task (Engle et
al., 1999; Hambrick & Engle, 2002), with controlled attention assuming greater
importance for novel tasks but decreasing as an influence as practice increased
(Ackerman, cited in Engle et al., 1999).
Additionally, people in a state of cognitive overload may be aware of the fact at
some level, even an unconscious one—as for example in the presence of activated
memory influencing strategy but below conscious awareness (Cowan, 1988)—and be
able to deploy certain strategies to compensate. Bryan and Harter (1897) observed the
experienced telegraph operator being able to start and continue a conversation, and even
respond to requests for information and direction, without breaking off the central task of
operating the telegraph key, yet without engaging in any evident cognitive “switching”
process. This accords with Sweller’s (2006) suggestion that under high cognitive load,
the processing of new information would be impaired, including the conscious synthesis
of strategies based upon the new data (see also Cowan, 1988). However, extraction of
information from LTM would not be subject to any such restrictions, thus giving
additional “processing capacity” to responses drawn from experience (Baddeley, 2001).
Practice effects and expertise. The maintenance of a certain level of cognitive
activity, or the regular practice of certain such activities, may facilitate the neural
pathways through which they occur (myelination). This could include a facility in
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reasoning/logical process, in learning, even in learned filtering, the reduction of
processing of distractive stimuli. The process of thinking and problem solving is a
function of acquired knowledge (Sweller, 2006). Baddeley (2001) suggested much of
what we do, and are able to do, was habituated, and by implication required a reduced
amount of processing for non-novel tasks. Therefore, while WM may be in use, the way
it is being used depends on what has been learned (by the individual) about how to use it.
Could problem-solving techniques, or even distraction-avoidance strategies, be
learned and incorporated into personal schemata sufficiently to boost performance?
Moreover, why in that case would there be the need for constant rehearsal and
refreshment of the facility? It was noted that expertise—long-term practice in a particular
domain—may bring long-term benefits in efficiency, as speed of reaction and
performance (Paas & Sweller, 2012). It is generally proposed that such expertise is
domain-specific—that is, it does not translate outside its own sphere (Healy, Wohldmann,
Sutton, & Bourne Jr., 2006). However, research suggested that where such training
placed high demands upon WM, the “domain” could be considered the control of
attention itself, and could be transferrable to performance in other tasks with high WM
demands that would be facilitated by such enhanced control (Barrett et al., 2004; Engle et
al., 1999; Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, Jonides, & Perrig, 2008). Colom et al.(2006) went even
further and asserted that the entire WM system was simply a mechanism for keeping
representation alive (see also Engle et al., 1999), and any additional capacity would be
generalized and non-domain-specific.
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The process of information-acquisition, and thus of schema modification, as
described by Sweller, (2006), is in almost all cases one of “creation.” It involves a trialand-error process during which an adapted schema is generated from the combination of
existing information, new information “borrowed” from the actions or statements of
others, and a “random generation and effectiveness testing procedure” (Sweller, 2006, p.
166). In the case of new information, this process randomly generates alternative
concepts and suggested actions, with the most “effective” being those retained after trials.
The remainder, which by not corresponding with previous information would offer no
evident “key” to the existing schema, are discarded. Sweller proposed that all new
information derived from others (by observation of their actions or assimilation of their
statements) is acquired through this process, and that no such information may be
acquired otherwise. However, Sweller also proposed that while the capacity of WM to
process new information may be limited, retrieval from LTM was not as restricted.
(Participants in this research study did not have the opportunity for trial-and-error, nor
information acquisition, which would indicate expertise gained from the real world and
applied to the test-taking.)
Accordingly, the more experience the individual has in being “busy,” in
everything from the handling of the physical and emotional experience, through
management of the effects upon the individual’s personal and daily life, to the potential
range of cognitive strategies that may be deployed, the better equipped the individual
may be to handle restricted available WMC—i.e., high cognitive load. In effect, the
individual has “learned” to be busy (cognitively loaded) and is able to process that data

52
flow without the intervention of consciousness (Jaeggi et al., 2008). The necessary
information—the building blocks of strategy, including as Sweller (2006) noted, not just
“the conditions under which particular problem-solving moves are appropriate, but
also…the consequences of those moves” (Sweller, 2006, p. 167)—is available in LTM
and need not be processed as new information.
Sweller (2006) asserted that the process of random generation of new approaches
and strategies was at its height in the process of problem-solving. Working memory is
inadequate for the performance of this process in demanding and time-sensitive situations
(Sweller, 2006). Indeed, Große and Renkl (2006) found that contrary to the suggestions
from other research, the more complex the problem, the less the available WM
“processing” capacity, and the less the ability to assess and manipulate the multiple
possible strategies required to address complex problems. However, the process of
random generation of new approaches, which for others involved a high degree of trialand-error in formulation, may arguably be replaced in the “busy” individual with the
much more efficient retrieval of preformed approaches (Hoffmann et al., 2013; Jaeggi et
al., 2007).
Experienced “busy” people may thus have developed more effective strategies for
finding additional information, which strategies—by efficiently connecting new
information to existing information—reduce the demand made on WM by the
“inferential” process— the trial-and-error generation of new strategies (Sweller, 2006).
Experienced busy people are also skilled at strategy-switching, which reduces the number
of strategies employed (Jaeggi et al., 2007). Notably, others not versed in such strategies
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might find that such additional information actually interfered with their inferential
process and in consequence slowed them down (Sweller, 2006).
Multitasking
Until recently, there has been little evidence to indicate that true cognitive
multitasking was possible, with some researchers at pains to repudiate the possibility
(Tombu & Jolicœur, 2004). Recent research has opened the door to the possibility, even
establishing some parameters for the existence of such a facility in the population, and for
the size of any effect. Some useful work has come from the area of computer studies—
multitasking being basic to modern computer systems—and particularly from the area of
human-computer interface (Salvucci & Taatgen, 2008; Salvucci, Taatgen, & Borst,
2009). However, a caution should be added: These studies do not, in the main,
demonstrate a common or accepted definition of “multitasking,” which in my own
assessment truly refers only to the simultaneous performance of multiple operations (or in
the term used by Salvucci & Taatgen, “threaded cognition” (2008, p. 101). Adler and
Benbunan-Fich (2012) raise the point in their early discussion—the parallel processing
that would constitute full multitasking is rare, and limited to certain specific
circumstances where the data streams being processed are of different types (e.g. words
and music.) Most of the “multitasking” operations to which these studies refer would
seem in fact to consist of rapid task-switching (Adler & Benbunan-Fich, 2012); most, but
not all, as will be discussed.
Adler and Benbunan-Fich (2012) developed an application in their laboratory
study that found performance levels improved to a degree for participants engaged with
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multitasking, as opposed to a control group that completed tasks in a linear progression.
These results showed an initial increase in productivity for the multi-tasking group;
however, too much multitasking proved to have a negative effect. Moreover, when the
researchers used accuracy rather than productivity as a performance measure, “the results
[were] not encouraging” (Adler & Benbunan-Fich, 2012, p. 167).
In a related study, Ie, Haller, Langer, and Courvoisier (2012) predicted that
mindful flexibility while performing a dual-task operation on a computer would lend itself
to increased multitasking performance. Mindful flexibility was defined as having
components of trait mindfulness, intolerance of ambiguity, thinking style, complexity,
and affective state (Ie et al., 2012). Their results indicated no significant affect pertaining
to mindfulness and multitasking. However, through regression analysis of the results,
younger and more mindful participants displayed elevated multitasking success compared
to the rest of the group. This study accords with the observations of Watson and Strayer
(2010) and Colom et al. (2010) that in tests of multitasking ability, some individual
participants performed significantly better than the group as a whole.
Judd (2013) monitored self-directed computer-based activities for prevalence of
multitasking versus task-switching and focused activity. This study involved tasks that
were not well-defined or part of a laboratory environment. Results of these monitored
sessions indicated that most student activity involved multitasking. The researcher
indicated that multitasking was most pronounced during independent studies; however,
this increased activity tended to include a significant amount of nonlearning activity,
leading to reduced attention to learning and decreased grades (Judd, 2013). Judd’s
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conclusions, based upon group outcomes, disregarded current research pertaining to
individual performance.
Junco and Cotten (2012) studied a group of college students that participated in a
survey and reported an overwhelming use of information communication technologies
while performing school work. The researchers noted their use of the term “multitasking”
as a loose and more colloquial one, actually better-defined in the context as “taskswitching.” Moreover, there was no suggestion in the study that the additional
information being sourced was congruent with, or even intended to support, the primary
goal-directed cognitive tasks with which other activities were being task-switched. After
a hierarchical linear regression, results indicated a marked decrease in grade point
averages within this test group during high frequency use of Facebook and texting (Junco
& Cotten, 2012). Moreover, the increased productivity became detrimental to the
accuracy of schoolwork and learning. Taken at face value, this study concurred with
Adler and Benbunan-Fich (2012) and other previous studies regarding decreases in
accuracy while participants are multitasking and task-switching. However, because (as
noted above) no account was taken as to the nature of the other activities, and their
congruence with the primary activities, the study remains one only of time use on goalcongruent vs. (presumably) incongruent time use.
In their study investigating the relationship between intelligence, working
memory capacity (WMC), and multitasking, Colom et al. (2010) studied multitasking
skills at an air traffic control training facility. This study focused on which of the two
factors, intelligence or WMC, would be more advantageous predictors of an individual’s
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ability to multitask. As predicted, both intelligence and WMC contributed to
multitasking, which concurred with previous studies cited therein (Colom et al., 2010).
However, once WMC was introduced as a correlate with intelligence, the regression
analysis resulted in intelligence no longer being able to predict an individual’s
multitasking performance. The researchers therefore concluded that intelligence was a
weaker predictor of an individual’s ability to multitask. WMC therefore exhibited as the
more efficacious predictor, even though the correlation between WM and intelligence
was significant (Colom et al., 2004). Law, Trawley, Brown, Stephens, and Logie (2013)
noted that WM and long-term memory contributed to dual-task performance for
participants in a study exploring ability to achieve predetermined goals. (It should
however be noted that Law et al., 2013, considered multitasking only as time-switching
or interleaving rather than true simultaneous task-performance.) Within a laboratory
setting, individuals made on-the-fly adjustments to the plans set forth toward completion
of their goals, and WM allocated cognitive resources based on contextual circumstances
(Law et al., 2013). These results supported Ie et al. (2012) and mindful flexibility,
because Law et al. (2013) also noted executive functions managing WM and cognitive
load in order to achieve fluctuating goals, regardless of preparation and memorization of
plans toward completion.
Where full (dual-task or better) multitasking is given consideration, received
wisdom has been that increasing distraction degrades task performance by reducing the
attention available for performance of the task (Watson & Strayer, 2010). Watson and
Strayer (2010) based their study on the common concern over distracting cellphone
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conversations while driving, coupled with the noted conviction of many drivers that they
personally are able to undertake the activity without loss of attention (see also Salvucci
and Taatgen, 2008, who cited the same activity as a common example). Watson and
Strayer’s special concern was the possibility that for some, this assertion might be true:
Some people, countertheoretically, might possess this capability, suggesting then the
possibility of true cognitive multitasking. The aim was to explore whether individual
differences might encompass such a possibility, hitherto hidden in aggregated data. Use
of a cellphone while engaging in the task of driving could be considered equivalent to a
standard dual-task methodology for the exploration of task performance under cognitive
load. The second task in classic methodology was typically memorization and rehearsal
of objects while processing the primary task. In this case the researchers used an auditory
version of operation span (OSPAN), a standard test used to measure performance under
induced cognitive load (Engle, 2002).
With so many participants (N=200) this was a large study, clearly intended to
reveal what was expected to be a very small effect that might otherwise be subsumed
within the aggregate of a small population. The study was successful in dis-aggregating
the results to uncover an underlying minority of supertaskers, approximately 2.5% of the
population, who apparently possessed the ability to perform under imposed cognitive
load significantly better than the majority, with no degradation of performance under
dual-task stress (Watson & Strayer, 2010). Moreover, supertaskers demonstrated
surprising proficiency in both single- and dual-task phases. Indeed, while their
performance on individual tasks was good, multitasking performance was very good. The

58
researchers were careful to undertake additional testing and simulations (the post-hoc use
of a Monte Carlo simulation) to eliminate the possibility of such a result arising by
chance or statistical fluke. They were unable to find any such flaw in experiment or
analysis. The conclusion was that these subjects, a small but real subset, genuinely
possessed abilities that differed both from the general population and from theoretical
prediction. Further support was given to the notion of true multi-tasking by Dux et al.
(2009), who while not suggesting that true multitasking may generally be found, noted
the possibility of being able to develop the facility and demonstrated some initial steps in
that direction.
It may also be appropriate to differentiate between the preference for multitasking
and the behavior itself. In 1959 the anthropologist Edward Hall coined the term
polychronicity (cited in König & Waller, 2010) to refer to the tendency to do multiple
tasks at once. Subsequently, multiple definitions for polychronicity have complicated the
general understanding of the term (König & Waller, 2010). König & Waller reviewed
literature concerning the earliest theories of polychronicity, noting multiple assumptions
were made regarding the social activity and orientation of individuals, alongside the
disregarding of time constraints (2010). König and Waller proposed a more complete
definition: “The term polychronicity should only be used to describe the preference for
doing several things at the same time, whereas the behavioral aspect of polychronicity
should be referred to as multitasking” (König & Waller, 2010, p. 175). Characteristics of
participants in research studies in polychronicity were seen to differ little from the
suggested definition of volitionally busy participants.
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Grawitch and Barber (2013) extended research into polychronicity beyond the
laboratory “with practical tasks people perform every day” (p. 222); notably, this
description is almost identical to those used by Gilbert & Osborne (1989) and Martin and
Park (2002) to describe everyday busyness. Grawitch and Barber’s results were in
concordance with previous research regarding performance and multitasking: however,
they also suggested polychronicity could predict multitasking only in participants with
low self-control. The participants that exerted more self-control were able to perform
multiple tasks at high levels.
Learned Cognitive Strategies
WM has been conceived as concurrently storing and processing information
(Baddeley, 2001, citing Daneman and Carpenter). The strength of the ability to do both
simultaneously, known as working memory span, was also noted as a predictor of skill
and speed in other cognitive tasks requiring this facility (Engle, 1996). It was suggested
some time ago that working memory span would form a good predictor of general
intelligence (Carpenter & Just, 1990; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990), which suggestion has
found later experimental support (Halford, Cowan, & Andrews, 2007). However, this
must be seen against the finding that learned or acquired strategies may account for some
of the differences between high-span and low-span research participants (Jaeggi et al.,
2007). A parallel could be drawn with Wiseman’s work (2003) on the nature of “lucky”
and “unlucky” people, demonstrating that differing perceptual and social strategies,
which can be re-learned and changed, make a great difference in the way people both
perceive themselves and the world, and in the effect they have upon the world.
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Jaeggi et al. (2007) suggested it would be possible to differentiate between people
who will perform better or worse under cognitive overload, with the two defining
characteristics being individual capacity and intent to succeed. This would also suggest a
degree of self-efficacy, which is the belief or experience that one will be able either to
succeed, or to have a sufficient chance of success to make the effort worth attempting. As
described in the section on multitasking above, goal orientation, for certain individuals,
increased attentional biases and their ability to perform multiple tasks at the same time,
but only with reduced proficiency and poor outcomes. It is, however, established by
Jaeggi et al. (2007) and others that test subjects varied as individuals, yet were seen to
perform only in a like manner as a group (see also Fitousi & Wenger, 2011). Thus, only
with particular attention to such individual differences could a few individuals be
observed to overcome the demands of very high cognitive load (Watson & Strayer,
2010). One such reason for a lack of agreement on methodology that would identify such
individual differences was a lack of proper definitions and properly-defined constructs,
which would determine the proper variables within cognitive load theory (Fitousi &
Wenger, 2011). As suggested by Kim et al. (2005), a good start might come from turning
the focus of research towards the tasks encountered by WM and not on the differentiation
of how WM and attention interact.
Summary
As seen in this review of literature, WM models contributed to other cognitive
theories, such as Cognitive Load Theory, Perceptual Load Theory, and Busyness.
Continued development into the existing body of research suggests an opportunity for
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future studies to explore the individual strategies regarding volitional busyness. Research
has shown encouraging results with regard to an individual’s ability to perform multiple
tasks; however, the body of research lacks the findings on an individual’s predisposition
toward, and background level of, busyness and how this affects cognitive task
performance. Of particular importance and interest is establishing the differentiation
between group and individual ability to perform under conditions of very high load. It
may be safe to suggest that the concept of supertaskers, as indicated by Watson and
Strayer (2010), defines a relatively small group with the propensity to perform multiple
tasks, yet the necessary data to contribute to and further explore this finding does not yet
exist.
This quantitative cross-sectional correlational study investigated the performance
of participants on a standard cognitive task, scored using standard measures of
performance and working memory. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology and
instruments, including the Martin & Park Environmental Demands Questionnaire. This
both collects basic demographic data and derives scale data from self-reports on
questions related to busyness in daily life, and the degree to which respondent follows a
structured daily routine.
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology
The purpose of this study was to identify and describe the cognitive performance
of a group of people whose levels of volitional busyness differ. This chapter covers the
research design, including three independent variables and the two instruments from
which they were derived, the single dependent variable, and the research instrument
itself. The population and sample are described, the research question and hypotheses are
provided, the data analysis plan is presented and explained, and threats to validity are
discussed. Finally, IRB documents and considerations are discussed and explained.
Research Design and Rationale
The research design was of a quantitative nature, intended to explore the possible
effect of two hypothesized and one recognized influence on cognitive performance.
Therefore, a multiple linear regression was used to assess the independent variables of
Busyness, Routine, and Working Memory and their predictive effects on the criterion
variable of cognitive task performance. Because there was to be no manipulation of the
independent or dependent variables, this study followed a nonexperimental quantitative
design to investigate a correlational association (Gliner, Morgan, & Leech, 2011). The
study was conducted by using online surveys and activities in the form of structured
games that gathered data quantifying the constructs of busyness, routine, working
memory, and cognitive task performance. The Martin & Park Environmental Demands
Questionnaire (MPEDQ) was administered to participants through online surveys,
followed by an assessment of working memory and cognitive performance using the
Corsi Block Tapping and Tower of London games, respectively.
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Consideration was given to use of an analysis of variance (ANOVA), but that
would have been limited to a yes/no answer on the existence of an effect, thereby missing
any predictive effects available in the three continuous scale variables. As this was new
research, with so little prior research from which to draw, the preservation of such data
and their use for maximum predictive value were seen to be paramount. A multiple linear
regression is the appropriate statistic when the purpose of a study is to look at the
relationship that two or more independent variables might have on a continuous
dependent variable (Johnson & Christensen, 2014).
Methodology
Population
The target population for the study was adults aged 34 to 84. This coincides with
the population for which the core instrument, the Martin and Park Environmental
Demands Questionnaire, was validated (see description below). The estimated U.S.
population for the closest available demographic (35-84) is 162,199,938, according to the
2013 Census (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.).
Sampling and Sampling Procedures
The sample was intended to be drawn both online—from or through the Walden
University research participant pool, and through any other participants as might be
interested—and “live,” by direct request to individuals likely to fit the demographic (e.g.,
through attendance at conventions and similar events). The use of paid participants,
through the online Amazon Mechanical Turk service, was also included as a backup
option. A simple demographic instrument, included as part of the online process, was to
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act as a screening tool. Participants were to be recruited according to the age norming for
the MPEDQ (34-84) with a backup exclusion in the first demographic instrument for any
potential participants actually outside the age range.
Prior research suggested a range of effect strengths for the effect of cognitive load
on cognitive processing. Hutter and Crisp (2006) found ηp2 = .120, a medium effect; the
creators of the Busyness construct, Martin and Park (2003), reported r = 0.38, also a
medium effect. However, Crisp et al. (2004) reported d =0.34, a small effect. Based on
these studies, a hypothesized effect size of r =.30 was adopted. Howell (2012)
recommended that power be near .80, an alpha of .05, and at least a small effect size.
Using G*Power 3.1.7 with the proposed effect size, an α of .05, a power of .80, it was
calculated that a sample of at least 84 participants would be required (Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2007).
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
Originally, I proposed to post the project in the information area for Walden’s
participant pool and offer it through other channels such as professional conferences and
listservs, as well as through direct recruitment at professional conferences with the offer
of a small incentive ($20 gift card) for fully completing the study. While this may appear
to be a higher-than-normal cost per participant, I considered it necessary to offer that
level of incentive in order to attract the self-described “busy” participant, who might
otherwise be inclined to refuse to participate on grounds of being “too busy.” Enhancing
the range of busyness scores in this way seemed essential to ensure that results were not
just based on those participants clustered around the median, but also offered more

65
extreme scores and thus the possibility of relating anomalous scores to measurements
outside the norm (Jaeggi et al., 2007; Watson & Strayer, 2010). I had funds available for
this from my own resources, originating in student loans and a recent legacy. Amazon
Mechanical Turk was included as a backup option in case these sources proved
insufficient to reach the required numbers within the time available for research. Due to
time constraints, recruitment proceeded using Amazon Mechanical Turk alone. IRB
approval was obtained prior to starting the study. Walden University’s approval number
for this study is 05-04-16-0096896, and it expires on May 3, 2017.
The only directly relevant demographic information to be collected was age. This
was partly to ensure participants fell into the normed range for the core instrument, and
partly to allow for data correction (see below). However, gender and education were also
collected to revalidate MPEDQ and to postanalyze for possible future projects.
Participants were offered informed consent information as part of the introduction to the
projects, with an opportunity to receive it in hard copy.
Data were to be collected through an online process comprising the following:
1. A survey-type instrument, implemented either through Walden University’s
online system or through the web-based version of Inquisit 4. This would
depend on participant source and combined a demographic data collection
instrument and an online version of the MPEDQ.
2. Two games developed by Millisecond Software as online implementations of
recognized cognitive tests.
3. An exit form. (See schematic of the process and form data attached.)
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Participants could exit the study at any time through a provision built into the
process. Noncompensated participants were to be offered an opportunity for questions
and/or comments, a means to receive their incentive for participation, and (if requested)
their own results on the test. Those who wanted a summary of the final research were to
be asked to leave contact details (email for preference), to be held separately from the
main data and aggregated for contact purposes only. They would then be sent a link to the
final study.
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs
Participants in the study were first offered an online consent form explaining the
project, risks and benefits, and exit procedures. At this point, they were assigned a unique
identifier. They began the data-collection part of the project by filling out a short surveytype form online, largely using radio buttons and Likert scales. This survey collected
basic demographic information alongside the 11 questions that form the Martin and Parks
Environmental Demands Questionnaire.
On completion of the opening/welcome module, participants transitioned (online,
and in theory, seamlessly) to the two online activities that gathered data on the other
variables—working memory (Corsi Block Tapping Test and performance on a cognitive
task, the Tower of London).
Martin & Park Environmental Demands Questionnaire (MPEDQ)—
Busyness and Routine. Martin and Park (2003) constructed the MPEDQ to assess the
level of environmental demands (daily tasks and routines) of a group of adults aged 3584. Although the initial (norming) sample was a group with rheumatoid arthritis, the

67
authors of the study noted that there was no other significant difference between the
sample and other groups in that age band. The MPEDQ is made up of 11 self-report
questions that measure two factors, Busyness and Routine. This instrument was integral
to the design of the study, relating continuing environmental demands to the ability to
perform cognitive tasks through cognitive load.
Busyness, focusing on the perceived engagement in active tasks. This variable is
measured by seven items on a 5-point scale, with responses ranging from not at all or
never to extremely or very often. Scoring for all items (e.g., “How busy are you during an
average day?”) ranges from 1 to 5. The scores from all items are then averaged, with a
higher score indicating greater density of busyness. The total range of scores is 1-35.
Routine, focusing on the perceived engagement in predictable events. This
variable is measured by four items on a 5-point scale, with responses ranging from never
to very often. Scoring for all items (e.g., “How often do your days follow a basic
routine?”) ranges from 1 to 5. The scores from all items are then averaged, with a higher
score indicating a higher degree of predictable behaviour. The total range of scores is 120.
Permission to use this instrument was received from Dr. Mike Martin, by email
received on May 29, 2011, supported by Dr. Denise Park in an email on May 4, 2015,
both of which are located in Appendix A. Reliability and internal consistency were
acceptable for the two factors of busyness and routine, with alpha values of .88 and .74,
respectively (Martin & Park, 2003). Soubelet and Salthouse (2010) used the instrument to
investigate the association between openness and intelligence with demanding or routine
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activities. In their sample of 2,257 adults between the ages of 18 to 96 years (mean age
50.3, SD =18.6), busyness and routine had coefficients of reliability of .88 and .81,
respectively, with a correlation between the scales of -0.31.
Corsi Block Tapping Test—Working memory. Developed by Corsi in 1972 (as
noted by Kessels, Van Zandvoort, Postma, Kappelle, & De Haan [2000] and Pagulayan,
Busch, Medina, Bartok, & Krikorian [2006]), the test is widely used among multiple
populations for the assessment of working memory. It provides numeric assessment of
the “capacity of the visuospatial sketch pad” (Pagulayan et al., 2006, p. 1044). Noting
that such capacity is also affected by aging, Monaco, Costa, Caltagirone, and Carlesimo
(2013) created corrective tables that may be used to normalize the data from an
application of the test.
The Corsi Block-Tapping Test yields two possible scores—Block Span, being the
length of the longest sequence remembered, and Total Score, being a product of Block
Span and the number of correct trials. The latter is the more sensitive measure, yielding a
wider range of possible scores, making it easier to identify performance of individuals
and small groups (Kessels et al., 2000). Accordingly, the Total Score was adopted for this
project, with higher scores indicating higher working memory. The total range of scores
(Total Score) is 2-144.
This particular version is a computer-based implementation running under
Inquisit 4 (2014) and was used under paid license. It was chosen because it is an
attractive, easy- (and even fun-) to-use implementation requiring few instructions and
minimal preparation. Brunetti, Del Gatto, and Delogu (2014) conducted a study of a
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similar implementation. It also integrates well with the cognitive task that follows it, in
terms of administration and flow, running under the same software suite. While there was
a cost associated with this instrumentation (approximately $1,000), I was able to meet it
from my own resources.
It is to be expected that the results of a test of working memory will be affected
by age (Darowski et al., 2008). In the case of the Corsi, a recent study of a large
population (Monaco et al., 2013; n=362) yielded correction grids for age, which were
available to be applied to the results of this test post hoc.
Tower of London—Cognitive task. This is a version of the Tower of Hanoi, a
traditional tower-and-ball game, respecified by Shallice (1982) as a test of executive
function and planning abilities. Tower of London has been widely used and studied (Berg
& Byrd, 2002; Krikorian, Bartok, & Gay, 1994). I chose this task because, while it
imposes attentional and sequential load, calling upon the planning facility believed to
form part of frontal-lobe-based executive function (Krikorian et al., 1994), it does not
load specifically or substantially on working memory, thus avoiding duplication of
testing and increasing separation between the factors. The Tower of London generates a
simple numeric score, with increasing score representing increased performance. The
total range of scores is 0-36.
Like the Corsi Block Tapping Test (see above), this particular version is a
computer-based implementation running under Inquisit 4 (2014) and was used under paid
license. It was chosen because it is an attractive, easy- (and even fun-) to-use
implementation requiring few instructions and minimal preparation. It also integrates
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well with the cognitive task that precedes it, running under the same software suite. It
generates a simple numeric score (Krikorian et al., 1994).
This test has not been normed on older adults; norming has occurred with young
adults only, with a mean age of 21.6 years (Krikorian et al., 1994). Krikorian et al.(1994)
noted that in young people, the effect of age on results of this test is only notable in a
comparison between fifth graders and young adults, there being otherwise (above age 12)
no statistical difference between them and the performance results of the young adults. A
similar effect is shown in the Porteus Maze Test, where the effects of age and education
in younger populations serve to improve performance, but only up to a certain point
(Krikorian & Bartok, 1998). In the absence of correction data for Tower of London, the
effect of age was to be investigated in the regression analysis and corrected if necessary.
Data Analysis Plan
All data were inputted and analyzed through SPSS version 22.0 for Windows.
Descriptive statistics were assessed and described the sample demographics and the
variables of interest used in the analysis. Frequencies and percentages were calculated for
categorical data, and means and standard deviations were calculated for continuous data
(Howell, 2012).
Data were screened for accuracy, missing data, and outliers. The presence of
outliers was tested by the examination of standardized values. Standardized values
represent the number of standard deviations the value is from the mean. Standardized
values greater than 3.29 are considered to be outliers and were to be potentially removed
from the data set (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Cases with missing data were to be
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examined for nonrandom patterns. Participants were excluded for noncompletion of the
research process, either the MPEDQ questionnaire or the cognitive efficiency test itself.
Prior to analysis, the assumptions of multiple linear regression were assessed. The
assumptions of the multiple linear regression include normality, homoscedasticity, and
absence of multicollinearity. Normality and homoscedasticity were assessed by
examination of scatter plots (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). Multicollinearity was assessed
using variance inflation factors (VIF), with values over 10 suggesting the presence of
multicollinearity and a violation of the assumption (Stevens, 2012).
The project gathered data to test the hypothesis that in addition to working
memory, the level of volitional or self-induced busyness, as derived from the two
MPEDQ measures Busyness and Routine, is also a predictor of performance on a
cognitive task.
To explore those potential relationships, the following research questions were
proposed.
RQ1: Is busyness related to performance on a cognitive task?
Null Hypothesis 1: Busyness is unrelated to performance on a cognitive task.
Alternative hypothesis: Busyness is associated with performance on a cognitive
task.
RQ2: Is routine related to performance on a cognitive task?
Null Hypothesis 2: Routine is unrelated to performance on a cognitive task.
Alternative hypothesis: Routine is associated with performance on a cognitive
task.
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RQ3: Is working memory related to performance on a cognitive task?
Null Hypothesis 3: Working memory is unrelated to performance on a cognitive
task.
Alternative hypothesis: Working memory is associated with performance on a
cognitive task.
RQ4: Do Busyness, Routine, and working memory predict performance on a
cognitive task?
Null Hypothesis 4: None of the independent variables busyness, routine, and
working memory predict performance on a cognitive task.
Alternative Hypothesis: At least one of the variables busyness, routine, and
working memory predict performance on a cognitive task.
To assess the research questions, Pearson correlations were posed to inform
hypotheses one through three, and were performed first. A multiple linear regression was
then used to examine Research Question 4. Multiple regression is an appropriate analysis
when the goal of research is to assess the extent of a relationship among a set of
dichotomous or interval/ratio predictor variables on an interval/ratio criterion variable.
Variables were to be evaluated based on what each contributed to the prediction
of the dependent variable that was different from the predictability provided by the other
predictors (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2013). The F test was to be used to assess whether the
set of independent variables collectively predicts the dependent variable. R-squared—the
multiple correlation coefficient of determination—was reported and used to determine
how much variance in the dependent variable could be accounted for by the set of
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independent variables. The t test was used to determine the significance of each predictor
and beta coefficients were to be used to determine the extent of prediction for each
independent variable. For significant predictors, every one unit increase in the predictor,
the dependent variable would increase or decrease by the number of unstandardized beta
coefficients.
Threats to Validity
Threats to the external validity of the study pertain to limitations on the ability to
generalize the results to the larger population in different variations (Johnson &
Christensen, 2014). However, I structured the sampling strategy in an effort to gather a
representative sample of the target population through just one inclusion criterion, which
opens the study to a diverse set of potential participants. Additionally, the findings of this
study would be applicable to all settings and times, due to the characteristics of interest
being a part of the human cognitive architecture (Kalyuga, 2011).
Threats to internal validity pertain to the power of the study to infer relationships
between the variables of interest (Gliner et al., 2011). Due to the design of this study,
only experimental mortality and instrumentation might be considered possible threats in
this area.
Experimental mortality. It has been noted that those with busier lifestyles might
not be interested in the study, or prepared to take the time to participate, due to precisely
the degree of environmental demands I am attempting to explore. Without question, the
tests take some time to perform, and I rejected other tests that were tedious to the point of
irritation, judging they would not therefore hold the attention of participants. If
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participants failed to complete the second part of the study, the section with the Corsi and
Tower of London games, then the attrition rate would be high. This might possibly flatten
out the Busyness-based demographic. That is, potential participants refusing or failing to
take the test/play the game because are “too busy” might eliminate some of the busier,
and thus more interesting, participants at the expense of a stronger effect.
While this possibility might not spoil the overall sample, if there was a threshold
effect requiring a certain minimum level of Busyness for any effect to be noted (similar
to perceptual load—see Lavie, 1995) it might have left me with too few individuals
exceeding that level to detect. If, for example, the proportion of the overall population
exhibiting the effects of volitional busyness were to be analogous to the proportion of
multi-taskers as described by Watson and Strayer (2010), that is only about 2.5% of the
population. With the number of participants presently projected, the chance of finding
even one such was small. This could possibly be have been dealt with through more
targeted recruitment of “busy” people, as I was not looking to generalize the prevalence
of high Busyness or of any purported effect to the population as a whole. (While there
was little control over the characteristics of the participants that might have been
recruited through Walden’s participant pool, more direct recruitment [e.g., professional
conventions] might have been targeted more directly at such “busier” individuals.)
Instrumentation. Threats to instrumentation were minimized by the selection of
reliable and validated instruments for measuring the proposed constructs. Measurement
validity was addressed by the theory review of the variables of interest, as well as the
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quality of the instruments chosen. Each instrument has psychometric properties gleaned
from prior studies that have utilized the instruments.
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Chapter 4: Results
Traditional wisdom, backed by research (Baddeley & Hitch, 1972; Tombu &
Jolicoeur, 2004), has been that increased cognitive load leads to decreased performance.
However, recently there has been research suggesting, or allowing for the possibility of,
just the opposite (Baddeley, 2003; Hoffman, von Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2013; Kim,
Kim, & Chun, 2005; Pontari & Schenker, 2000). In order to address these apparent
contradictions, this study was designed to identify and describe the cognitive
performance of a group of people whose levels of volitional busyness differ.
This chapter begins with a description of the data collection and the preanalysis
data cleaning, as well as a description of the sample. A summary of the results is given,
along with a more detailed analysis. This chapter ends with a brief summary and a
transition to the next chapter.
Data Collection
Recruitment of participants for data collection was proposed to take place using
the Walden University Participant Pool, through direct recruitment at professional
conferences, or through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Though these were the initially
proposed methods of data collection, IRB requirements rendered the first two
impracticable within the time available. Ultimately, all data collection was conducted
through compensated participants using Amazon Mechanical Turk only, in two separate
batches on June 16 and 23, 2016 (IRB Approval #05-04-16-0096896).
Mechanical Turk workers were presented with a sequence of data collection
instruments, starting with basic demographic questions (age, education, gender) and
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proceeding directly to an online implementation of the MPEDQ. This was presented as a
series of Likert scales using (in this online version) radio buttons, accepting only one
selection per question. On completion of the MPEDQ, the worker was taken (in a process
designed to be as seamless as possible) straight through to the Corsi Block Tapping Test.
On completion of the Corsi, a link took the worker to the final task, the Tower of London.
Before collecting the data, I was concerned that Mechanical Turk respondents,
whose remuneration would be based on time spent—the more online tasks they
completed, the more they would get paid—might be tempted to take the easy way out and
simply make the same selection down the screen through the series of questions
presented. I did make a visual examination of the scores, and it was not evident that such
spurious scoring was taking place. A comparison of the scores to any other source, such
as the small pilot study I conducted or (if available) data from Soubelet and Salthouse
(2010) or from the MPEDQ validation study (Martin & Park, 2003), would have been
outside the intended scope of this research, and probably impracticable given the nature
of this study as dissertation research. There was one instance of outright attempt to enter
false data, where one Mechanical Turk worker entered different data under two different
“personalities” but still associated with the same Mechanical Turk worker number. This
was detected at the data screening stage, and both records were removed.
Preanalysis Data Cleaning
Participants signed in online to a sequence of tasks, beginning with a survey
containing basic demographics and a series of questions implementing the MPEDQ,
leading in to two brief games. These were online implementations of the standard
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assessment tools, the Corsi Block Tapping Test and the Tower of Hanoi, developed by
Millisecond Software. Because of the data collection method, participant data were
received in multiple data sets, though the data collection site also provided a unique
identifier for each participant so that data from each set could be matched into a final data
set. That also served to preserve the anonymity of the participants, whose personal
information (name, address, etc.) was not available to or retrievable by me from any
given identifier.
The data were retrieved from these four separate sets, one for demographics, one
being the MPEDQ implementation, and two for the remaining tests (Corsi test and Tower
test). After these sets were combined by matching participants’ unique numbers, a total of
120 participants’ scores could be matched to one another to create a full data set with all
four subsets; these matched cases were first examined for meeting the age criteria for the
study, then for duplicate and missing cases. A total of 28 cases were identified and
removed as either (a) not meeting inclusion criteria (i.e., participant was less than 35
years old, n =24), (b) not completing one or more of the tests (n =2), or (c) being
duplicate entries (n =2). As such, these cases were removed from the originally gathered
120, and the final dataset contained a total of 92 participants.
Descriptive Statistics
The final sample of 92 participants consisted of 49 (53.30%) men and 43
(46.70%) women, with an average self-reported age of 41.00 years (SD = 7.57). The
majority of participants were self-reported college graduates (n = 41, 44.60%) or had
completed some college (n = 23, 25.00%). The participants scored an average of 19.98 in
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Busyness (SD = 3.89), 9.17 in Routine (SD = 2.30), and 60.00 in Working Memory (SD =
24.30). Participants had an average cognitive task performance score of 31.34 (SD =
4.02). All frequencies and percentages are presented in Table 1. All means and standard
deviations are presented in Table 2.
Table 1
Frequencies and Percentages for Demographic Information
Variable

n

%

Male

49

53.30

Female

43

46.70

High school diploma or equivalent

15

16.30

College graduate

41

44.60

Master’s/doctoral/professional degree

9

9.80

Some college—No degree

23

25.00

Some graduate school—No degree

4

4.30

Gender

Education

80
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for Variables of Interest
Variable

Min

Max

M

SD

Age

35.00

74.00

41.00

7.57

Busyness

11.00

29.00

19.98

3.85

Routine

5.00

15.00

9.17

2.30

Working memory

2.00

117.00

60.00

24.30

Cognitive task

15.00

36.00

31.34

4.02

Detailed Analysis
Analyses were conducted in line with the four guiding research questions. A set of
one null and one alternative hypothesis aligned with each research question and was used
in each inferential test. The four questions were as follows:
RQ1: Is busyness related to performance on a cognitive task?
Null Hypothesis 1: Busyness is unrelated to performance on a cognitive task.
Alternative hypothesis: Busyness is associated with performance on a cognitive
task.
RQ2: Is routine related to performance on a cognitive task?
Null Hypothesis 2: Routine is unrelated to performance on a cognitive task.
Alternative hypothesis: Routine is associated with performance on a cognitive
task.
RQ3: Is working memory related to performance on a cognitive task?
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Null Hypothesis 3: Working memory is unrelated to performance on a cognitive
task.
Alternative hypothesis: Working memory is associated with performance on a
cognitive task.
RQ4: Do busyness, routine, and working memory predict performance on a
cognitive task?
Null Hypothesis 4: None of the independent variables busyness, routine, and
working memory predict performance on a cognitive task.
Alternative hypothesis: At least one of the variables busyness, routine, and
working memory predict performance on a cognitive task.
The present study included three Pearson correlations and a multiple linear
regression, aligned with each of the four research questions.The Pearson correlations
were posed to inform hypotheses 1 through 3 and were performed first. These analyses
were conducted to assess whether there were bivariate relationships between the three
independent variables (i.e., Busyness, Routine, and working memory) and the outcome of
performance on a cognitive task. Prior to each analysis, the assumptions of the
correlational test were examined. For these Pearson correlations, statistical assumptions
include linearity and homoscedasticity. For the linearity assumption to be met, a
scatterplot between each pair of variables under examination must show a linear pattern,
as opposed to a nonlinear pattern (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012). For the homoscedasticity
assumption, a scatterplot between the correlation residuals and the predicted values must
show a rectangular distribution for this assumption to be met (Stevens, 2009).
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Research Question 1
H01: Busyness is unrelated to performance on a cognitive task.
Ha1: Busyness is associated with performance on a cognitive task.
This hypothesis was examined using the first of three Pearson correlations.
Prior to analysis, the assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity were
assessed. The assumption of linearity was met (see Figure 1), as there was no evidence of
a nonlinear relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Similarly, the
assumption of homoscedasticity was met (see Figure 2), as the distribution of data points
on the residual scatterplot was approximately rectangular and random.

Figure 1. Scatterplot between Busyness and cognitive task performance.
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Figure 2. Scatterplot between the standardized and predicted values.
The results of the correlation between busyness and performance on a cognitive
task were not significant (r = .13, p = .217), indicating that there was no evidence for a
correlation between the two measurements. As such, the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected.
Research Question 2
H02: Routine is unrelated to performance on a cognitive task.
Ha2: Routine is associated with performance on a cognitive task.
This hypothesis was examined using the second of three Pearson correlations.
Prior to analysis, the assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity were
assessed. The assumption of linearity was met (see Figure 3), as there was no evidence of
a nonlinear relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Similarly, the
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assumption of homoscedasticity was met (see Figure 4), as the distribution of data points
on the residual scatterplot was approximately rectangular and random.

Figure 3. Scatterplot between Routine and cognitive task performance.
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Figure 4. Scatterplot between the standardized and predicted values.

The result of the correlation between routine and performance on a cognitive task
was not significant (r = -.18, p = .112), indicating that the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected.
Research Question 3
H03: Working memory is unrelated to performance on a cognitive task.
Ha3: Working memory is associated with performance on a cognitive task.
Hypothesis 3 was examined using the third and final of the Pearson correlations.
Prior to analysis, the assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity were
assessed. The assumption of linearity was met (see Figure 5), as there was no evidence of
a nonlinear relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Similarly, the
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assumption of homoscedasticity was met (see Figure 6), as the distribution of data points
on the residual scatterplot was approximately rectangular and random.

Figure 5. Scatterplot between working memory and cognitive task performance.
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Figure 6. Scatterplot between the standardized and predicted values.
The result of the correlation between working memory and performance on a
cognitive task was also not significant (r = .06, p = .587). Thus, the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected.
Research Question 4
H04: None of the independent variables Busyness, Routine, and working memory
is useful in predicting performance on a cognitive task.
Ha4: At least one of the variables Busyness, Routine, and working memory is
useful in predicting performance on a cognitive task.
In order to assess whether or not these same variables are useful in predicting
performance on a cognitive task when analyzed as a linear combination, a multiple linear
regression was conducted. The predictor variables for this analysis comprised each of the
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independent variables from the prior Pearson correlations, including Busyness, Routine,
and working memory. Because none of the previous correlational analyses supported the
existence of a relationship between any of the independent variables (i.e., Busyness,
Routine, or working memory) and the dependent variable (i.e., performance), it was
unlikely that a linear combination of the three independent variables would result in a
significantly predictive regression equation. Because it is possible that the three
combined scores could provide enough information to significantly predict performance,
the regression equation was conducted nonetheless. The resulting regression equation
under examination for this analysis is as follows:
Performance = (Busyness)B1 + (Routine)B2 + (Working memory)B3 + error
For the multiple linear regression, assumptions for analysis include normality,
homoscedasticity, and the absence of multicollinearity. Normality was assessed using a
P-P plot, and homoscedasticity was assessed using a standardized residual plot. The
absence of multicollinearity was determined using variance inflation factor (VIF) scores,
where values over 10 indicate the presence of multicollinearity (Stevens, 2009). The
assumption of normality was met because the normal line did not deviate greatly from a
perfect 45-degree line (see Figure 7). Similarly, the assumption of homoscedasticity was
met based on the rectangular, random distribution of data seen in the plot of residuals (see
Figure 8). All VIF scores were well below 10 (see Table 3), thus the assumption of
absence of multicollinearity was met.
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Figure 7. P-P plot to assess for normality of multiple linear regression.
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Figure 8. Scatterplot between the standardized and predicted values.
The results of the multiple linear regression were not significant, F(3, 88) = 1.13,
p = .329, R2 = .04, indicating that collectively, busyness, routine, and working memory
do not significantly predict performance on a cognitive task. The R2 coefficient of .04
indicated that only up to 4% of the variance in performance on the cognitive task could
be explained by a linear combination of the three predictors, further supporting the lack
of significance. As significance was not found in the overall model, the coefficients were
not examined further. Table 3 presents the results of the multiple linear regression.
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Table 3
Regression Coefficients With Busyness, Routine, and Working Memory Predicting
Performance on a Cognitive Task
Variable

B

SE

β

t

p

VIF

Busyness

0.10

0.11

.10

0.89

.378

1.08

Routine

-0.24

0.19

-.14

-1.25

.216

1.09

Working memory

0.01

0.02

.05

0.46

.648

1.02

Ancillary Analysis
Several researchers have supported, or implicitly allowed for, the possibility that
there may be a nonlinear relationship between Busyness, Routine, and working memory
and the dependent variable of performance on a cognitive task (Lavie, 1995; Watson &
Strayer, 2010; Jaeggi et al., 2007; Ie et al., 2012). These researchers indicated that the
influence of cognitive load and working memory on performance on a cognitive task may
only be present at certain levels, or that effects only appeared at one end of the spectrum.
To assess this kind of relationship, which would not be monotonic, a modified
regression was conducted. In this modified regression, each of the independent variables
was squared to allow for the assessment of non-linear effects. Tabachnick and Fidell
(2012) cited this as an appropriate method for assessing this form of relationship. In this
regression, the same three variables of Busyness, Routine, and working memory were
treated as predictors, after being modified to the second power in line with Tabachnick
and Fidell’s (2012) suggestions. This resulted in a new regression equation being tested,
as follows:
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Performance = (Busyness2)B1 + (Routine2)B2 + (Working memory2)B3 + error
Because the modifications to the analysis do not influence the assumption tests,
there was no need to reassess the assumptions of normality, homoscedasticity, or
multicollinearity. Results of this second regression indicated that there was no significant
non-linear relationship between the squared variables of Busyness, Routine, or working
memory and performance on a cognitive task, F(3, 88) = 1.10, p = .354, R2 = .04.
Because of this outcome, the findings from hypothesis four can be confirmed, and
indicate that no significant relationship was found. Results of this ancillary regression are
presented in Table 4.
Table 4
Regression With Squared Values of Busyness, Routine, and Working Memory Predicting
Performance on a Cognitive Task
Variable

B

SE

β

t

p

VIF

Busyness (squared)

.00

.00

.09

0.86

.392

1.07

Routine (squared)

-.01

.01

-.14

-1.27

.207

1.08

Working memory (squared)

.00

.00

.03

0.33

.746

1.02

Chapter Summary
This chapter began with a restatement of the research purpose, a description of the
pre-analysis data treatment, as well as a description of the sample. This was followed by
both a summary and detailed analysis of the results. These results indicated that
Busyness, Routine, and working memory were not significantly correlated with
performance on a cognitive task, and thus the null hypothesis for Research Questions 1-3
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cannot be rejected. The results also suggested that Busyness, Routine, and working
memory were not able to collectively predict performance on a cognitive task, indicating
that the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 4 also cannot be rejected. In an ancillary analysis
of the three predictor variables, results did not indicate that there was a curvilinear
relationship between these variables and performance, and this form of relationship could
not be supported by the data either. Chapter 5 will discuss these results in terms of the
associated literature. Chapter 5 will also discuss any strengths, limitations, and
implications of the study. Additionally, future directions for research will be given.
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Chapter 5: Results, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
During work on my master’s thesis, I encountered the idea of the specialness of
busy people, or of the state of being busy (busyness). It took me only a little research to
reveal the widely popular and longstanding belief in the idea. Flying as this did in the
face of cognitive theory, I was curious and decided to explore the matter, and I took that
opportunity for my doctoral research. At the time (2007), most researchers confirmed the
deleterious effect of increased cognitive load on task performance—some notable
exceptions being Pontari and Schlenker (2000); Kim, Kim, and Chun (2005); and Jaeggi
(2007). Just a few years ago, however, new published research indicated cases of
significant performance beyond prediction under high cognitive load (Hoffmann, von
Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2013; Watson & Strayer, 2010). Indeed, by the 2011 special
summary of cognitive load theory and research in Computers in Human Behavior, it was
clear that the theory was proving inconsistent at best (Kirschner, Ayres, & Chandler,
2011). This opened a possible pathway to the “busiest man” thesis, as expressed by
Parkinson (“It is the busiest man who has time to spare”; 1957, p. 2), being compatible
with cognitive theory.
Statement of the Problem
The demands of everyday life impose a cognitive overhead (Gilbert & Osborne,
1989; Milgram, 1970) that may be equated to cognitive load or cognitive busyness
(Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Lieberman, 2000). Increasing cognitive load is associated with
a decrease in task performance (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Fitousi & Wenger, 2011;
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Lieberman, 2000). However, folk wisdom suggests that for some people, such busyness
might enhance performance (Payn, 1884; Smiles, 1866), and recent cognitive research
has shown performance beyond prediction in situations of high cognitive load (Jaeggi et
al., 2007) and even supported the possibility of high cognitive load enhancing processing
(Lavie, 1995). Accordingly, I set out to explore whether there were indeed people whose
cognitive performance was enhanced by high cognitive load. The effect of any particular
level of cognitive load would be affected by working memory capacity (WMC); thus, I
included WMC as a covariate. Subsequently, the problem that needs to be explored is
whether a high level of busyness has any positive effect on task performance, controlling
for working memory.
Review of the Methodology
After an initial trial write-up of a qualitative design, it became evident that a more
objective analysis would be needed for assertions such as those contained in the
hypotheses, which were outside mainstream cognitive theory. In particular, it would be
necessary to obtain a measure of the everyday task load of the participants. The matter of
assessing busyness resolved itself with the discovery of the MPEDQ, designed for that
purpose, while the link to cognitive theory came through Gilbert and Osborne's (1989)
assertion and Milgram's (1970) observation that everyday activities, including tasks and
social activities, give rise to cognitive load. Also, given Martin and Park's (2003)
assertion that existing instruments for assessment of daily activities offered significant
problems in administration, interpretation, and validity, the MPEDQ offered an easy-to-
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administer instrument that also offered the basis of a construct in which environmentally
generated cognitive load might be measured.
Drawing from associated research on reduction of processing load, including ideas
on load shedding, delayed processing, and controlled attention contained in perceptual
load theory and in earlier cognitive research (Cowan, 1988; Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham,
1988; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Lavie, 1995), I adopted Cowan's controlled-attention
model of working memory (1988) as the overarching theoretical basis for the project.
This reinforced the choice of a measurement-based (quantitative) research project, as the
primary issue was comparative performance under conditions of different levels of
variables (busyness, routine, working memory). While an experimental or quasiexperimental design was initially considered, the practical matter of establishing a control
group made this impractical. Accordingly, a correlational design was adopted.
This quantitative correlational study identified and described the cognitive
performance of a group of people whose levels of volitional busyness differed.
Specifically, I sought to identify, if they exist, subgroups of people whose cognitive
performance improved—rather than deteriorating or remaining unchanged—with greater
volitional busyness. As such, this project involved studying performance on a sample
cognitive task and exploring how measures of everyday busyness, as implicitly
moderated by the element of routine in participants’ daily lives, correlated with
performance on cognitive tasks. Cowan's model of working memory (1988), and the
work of Colom and various collaborators on the relationship between intelligence and
working memory (Colom, Abad, Quiroga, Shih, & Flores-Mendoza, 2008; see also
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Colom, Rebollo, Palacios, Juan-Espinosa, & Kyllonen, 2004), suggested that working
memory might also be a co-correlated factor, and accordingly a measure of working
memory was incorporated. In the final design, participants engaged in an online process,
starting with completion of a validated self-report instrument to measure busyness. They
then participated in two online activities; the first activity was a game that was designed
to measure working memory, and the second was a game that measured cognitive
performance.
As it was anticipated that any effect to be found would be a combination of the
variables rather than any single factor, multiple regressions (linear and curvilinear) were
used to identify any groups of participants exhibiting performance beyond predictions.
The curvilinear regression was introduced because of research suggesting that some
effects of cognitive load beyond predictions or averages would be found only in the upper
reaches of values (Ie, Haller, Langer, & Courvoisier, 2012; Jaeggi et al., 2007; Watson &
Strayer, 2010).
Summary of the Results
No element of the research hypotheses was substantiated, as neither busyness,
routine, nor working memory was seen to have any significant effect on the performance
of the cognitive task. As such, there was a failure to reject each hypothesis. Despite
suggestions from other research (Watson & Strayer, 2010) that exceptional results might
be seen only at one end of the curve, a curvilinear regression gave no results either.
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Interpretation of the Findings
The overarching research question was “Do Busyness, Routine, and working
memory predict performance on a cognitive task?” This gave rise to four hypotheses,
each purporting to describe a different correlation. While there is no research on the topic
of busyness as a trait, it is clearly defined as a state of being (“Busyness,” n.d.), and there
is published research in associated or analogous areas suggesting that at least some of the
hypotheses might be upheld.
Research Question 1
Busyness is associated with performance on a cognitive task. There is significant
literature on the impact of cognitive load on many types of cognitive activity, ranging
from reasoning and decision making to learning (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Gilbert &
Osborne, 1989; Lieberman, 2000). Accordingly, it was predicted that busyness, being a
measure of the type of activity that generates cognitive load (Gilbert & Osborne, 1989),
would affect performance on the Tower of London task. However, the effect was not
significant in this study. Additionally, Gilbert and Osborne (1989) asserted that
laboratory-induced cognitive load was “a mere replication” of environmentally induced
cognitive load, or the demands of daily life. Relying upon that assertion, measuring the
degree of those demands should prove a good construct for the measurement of ongoing
cognitive load. It is possible that the construct is not valid, and there is in fact a difference
between environmental and induced cognitive load. As such, the adverse cognitive effect
expected of cognitive load does not occur. Alternatively, there may be an issue with the
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project design, such as the type of task chosen, which did not load directly on working
memory—although see Baddeley and Hitch (1974).
Research Question 2
Routine is associated with performance on a cognitive task. The variable Routine
is uniquely associated with the MPEDQ instrument. By description, it stands as a
measure of structure in daily life activities, which by implication may serve as a
moderator of the effect of busyness. No direct reference to such a relationship could be
found in research other than Martin and Park (2003), although Tadic, Oerlemans, Bakker,
and Veenhoven (2013) did note that for older adults, the structure provided to their lives
by having a job does enhance happiness in nonworking times.
Research Question 3
Working memory is associated with performance on a cognitive task. It has long
been noted that processing of cognitive tasks is adversely affected when working memory
is tasked with more than one job to do (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Cowan, 1988). It was
also noted by Miller (1956) that working memory itself is subject to capacity limitations
(the number of values that may be retained, or the number of alternatives held
simultaneously) on an individual basis. That capacity is strongly associated with
cognitive task performance (Engle et al., 1999). That being the case, the impact of any
degree of cognitive load should be assessed in the light of the working memory
restrictions of the individual. However, in this case, working memory was not found to
have any significant impact on performance of this particular task.

100
Research Question 4
At least one of the variables (Busyness, Routine, and working memory) is useful
in predicting performance on a cognitive task. It would be expected that any of these
variables might have an effect upon the performance of the task at hand. Busyness, in its
generation of cognitive load (Gilbert & Osborne, 1989), would restrict the availability of
working memory capacity to process the task. Routine could moderate the effect of
busyness (Martin & Park, 2003), thus reducing its deleterious impact. Working memory,
as the “processing engine” (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), would provide more or less
processing power depending on the capacity of the particular individual. However, none
of the Pearson correlations gave a significant result. Moreover, it remained a possibility
that some combination of these factors was required; for example, under perceptual load
theory, where attentional focus and the rejection of distractors take place only in
conditions of simultaneous high perceptual load and no more than moderate cognitive
load (Lavie, 2010). The cognitive enhancement effect implied by the “busiest man”
hypothesis might only be seen in the outliers. Such was noted by Jaeggi (2007) in the
participants who continued to perform a cognitive-challenging task under very high
cognitive load, and by Watson and Strayer (2010) in the small percentage of participants
who exhibited genuine (and countertheoretical) multitasking abilities. Allowing for this
possibility, both linear and curvilinear multiple regression analyses were applied to the
data, but without significant result.
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Limitations of the Study
In some ways, the absence of support for the alternate hypothesis was not the least
anticipated finding. While strongly asserted by folk wisdom (Payn, 1884; Smiles, 1866),
and even supported as a possibility by recent cognitive research findings (Hoffmann, von
Helversen, & Rieskamp, 2013; Watson & Strayer, 2010), it always stood against
mainstream cognitive theory and would have required significant evidence to be
demonstrated conclusively. The major surprise, however, was the absence of any finding
that any of the variables tested affected performance on the cognitive task to any
significant degree. The MPEDQ was devised and designed to address a problem
perceived by the developers and others (Martin & Park, 2003; Whitbourne et al., 2008).
Yet in this case, there seemed to be no effect on the performance of the designated
cognitive task, rendering any rejection of the null hypothesis to be unsupported.
A number of possible explanations for why this may have happened are as
follows.
Lack of sensitivity of the MPEDQ. The quality of busyness is asserted in the
initial folk thesis as being strong, not needing any special equipment, training, or
techniques to identify, but capable of being directly observable in a “busy man,” clearly
identifiable and to be differentiated from others who are not so (Payn, 1884). As such, if
the "busy man" cannot be directly observed, then no effect can be attributed to observed
busyness, and the initial thesis fails by definition.
Nature of the working memory instrument: Corsi Block Tapping Test. The
Corsi test is a venerable and widely used (Berch, Krikorian, & Huha, 1998) standard
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measure of working memory span (serial/spatial/visuospatial), forming part of one of the
major neuropsychological testing batteries, the WAIS-R Neuropsychological Inventory
(Kaplan et al., 1991, as cited in Berch et al., 1998). When the total score is used, it is very
sensitive, with a possible score range of 2-144. This sample was slightly older, had
slightly more working memory, and was slightly more disparate than those in the original
Kessels et al. (2000) norming study. Perhaps the difference in age, or the implicit
selection of regular computer users were factors (as Mechanical Turk workers earn at
least some of their living through their computer skills). However, the test did pick up
variance with demonstrated sensitivity.
Nature of the cognitive task. There are many cognitive tasks available, even
under the chosen development software suite. The challenge in the design methodology
was to choose one that did not map directly upon working memory; that is, one that
offered no more than a score that correlated closely with working memory. The Tower of
London was chosen because of its mapping primarily upon executive function and
planning (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Gilbert & Osborne, 1989; Lieberman, 2000). It is
possible that the task does not rely sufficiently upon working memory as to call upon that
resource in a manner analogous to the problem being addressed by the MPEDQ
developers. The only other recorded use of the MPEDQ (Soubelet & Salthouse, 2010)
used intelligence tests, which have been asserted by some to be closely related to working
memory (Gutierrez & Kouvelis, 1991; Reimann, 1979), although, it should be noted, not
by others (Beier & Ackerman, 2005), or indeed by the same researchers in later years
(Colom et al., 2010).
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Parkinson's law and Mechanical Turk. In the original source or impetus for this
research, Parkinson asserted, “Work expands to fill the time available for its completion,”
which is termed Parkinson’s law (Parkinson, 1957, p. 2). Later research upheld this thesis
to a degree, codifying it as the excess time effect (ETE; Aronson & Gerard, 1966;
Aronson & Landy, 1967). In an unexpected echo of this source, I found that Mechanical
Turk respondents often took far longer on the series of tasks constituting this project than
they actually needed—longer, that is, than those who participated in initial pilot testing
took. Given that Mechanical Turk workers accumulate income by undertaking as many
projects as possible in the shortest time, this was surprising. However, recent research
substantiated the observation that time taken on a project is related not to the needs of the
project, but to the amount the Mechanical Turk worker is being paid for each task
completed (Cohen, Fort, Adda, Zhou, & Farri, 2016). Further replication of some of the
ETE studies might further the reliability of Mechanical Turk, with pointers to corrective
measures in design and administration.
Recommendations for Further Research
Further Refinement of the MPEDQ
The MPEDQ was designed on the premise that busyness adversely affects
performance on the cognitive task of medication adherence. But this study, using an
executive function (planning) task, did not find any significant effect. In the interests of
further exploration, and of closer definition of the nature of the MPEDQ measure, this
present study might usefully be replicated using a task that does load on working
memory, or controlling for working memory.
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The Nature of “Busy”
Though I have not mentioned it previously, I had suspected that the meaning of
the term busy had evolved over time; however, I was unsure if this change was
significant. The term busy did not always mean what it means today: “actively involved
in doing something or having a lot of things to do” (“Busy,” n.d.). Its original meaning
survives in the term busybody: “a person who is interested in things that do not involve
him or her, esp. other people’s private matters” (“Busybody,” n.d.). The comment, “It is
the busiest person that has time to spare” (Parkinson, 1957, p. 2) then becomes a sarcastic
remark, a criticism of the meddling person, rather than an observation on time
management or cognitive ability. Perhaps the Victorians, with their zeal for industry and
self-improvement, misinterpreted and took on the term, stripping it of the original
overtones. It is, then, possible that the survival of the concept is no more than a linguistic
stub with a shifted meaning, a misunderstanding absorbed first into popular folklore.
Implications
Implications for Positive Social Change
Going back to Parkinson's original analogy, the “Busy Man/Lady of Leisure”
comparison (Parkinson, 1957, p.2), there are still interesting points raised, perhaps
unintentionally. The characterizations created by Parkinson – “Busy Man,” “Lady of
Leisure” -- are not just implicitly sexist; they are also ageist, with the implications of agerelated memory issues, and classist, being engaged in different types of activities as befits
the evident socioeconomic status of each.
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However, within that stereotype, taken as presented or implied, are some useful
suggestions. For example, the Busy Man could indeed appear to be unaffected by his [sic]
busyness, to the degree that the tasks he is undertaking could be regarded as high-level
managerial-type tasks drawing upon planning, or executive function, rather than upon
memory. They may even be tasks calling upon expertise (Bedard & Chi, 1992), which is
a call on LTM and existing schemas (e.g. the “expert telegraphists”; Bryan & Harter,
1897), rather than those calling upon novel or creative approaches, which are more
demanding of working memory (Bedard & Chi, 1992; Kalyuga et al., 2003). The Lady of
Leisure, on the other hand, is engaged in significantly memory-based tasks such as
“...Finding [a] postcard, ... hunting for spectacles, ...a search for the address” (Parkinson,
p.2). Such activities being more memory-based may actually take longer with increased
load. It is notable that different values, implicitly, are placed on the task sets–the “Busy
Man” embodying those Victorian virtues of industry, and Being A Man, with the Lady
being “only” creative, more relaxed, but somehow less “productive.”
The primary difference between the two characters could even be seen as an issue
of prior organization or planning. The suggestion that Parkinson's law may not apply to
“busy people” may be found to be true to the degree that the tasks being undertaken by
those busy people are essentially planning tasks.
Implications for Practice
MPEDQ and the nature of medication adherence. Results of this study imply
that the MPEDQ may not be useable where the cognitive task was not based on working
memory. That is, unless working memory was being called on by the task, its
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performance did not seem to be affected by the demands of everyday tasks. If further
research were to substantiate that hypothesis, perhaps researchers in the area of
medication adherence might be encouraged to consider redesigning, or reconceptualising,
medication regimes as essentially planning tasks. In that case, the design of the
compliance/adherence regime would focus on charting when to take medications and
what the reminders would be, rather than handling them as memory-enhancement aids.
This might ameliorate the problems noted in the design stage for the MPEDQ.
Conclusion
The idea that busyness as a state of being confers some magical ability to perform
tasks more efficiently is a concept accepted by default, and in common belief, since
Victorian times or earlier. But common belief is no substitute for scientific examination,
which does not appear to have been undertaken prior to my recent research. As is often
the case, the belief fails to be supported by evidence. In this case, the belief seems to stem
from a Victorian-era distortion in meaning of an old term: busy.
It should, however, be noted that the trend lines of the correlations do run in such
a fashion as to suggest that a project designed for greater power might produce results at
the level of significance--especially on the relationship between Busyness and
performance, which might suggest its use as a valid construct for cognitive load.
Additionally, the absence of support under cognitive load theory for the “Busy Man”
hypothesis should not preclude its exploration under other paradigms, e.g., task or time
management.
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The results of this work suggest some shortcomings in cognitive theory on
induced and environmental cognitive load, and on the differing nature of the effect of
such a load on different types of tasks. Along the way, the project gathered useful
information on the MPEDQ instrument, suggesting refinements; drew attention to
possible shortcomings in the use of Amazon Mechanical Turk as a source of research
participants; and suggested future research on both those topics.
While these are useful contributions to the body of cognitive knowledge and
theory, perhaps the most useful contribution of the project is emphasizing the need for
examination and an evidentiary base for accepted wisdom. For example, as an
unfortunate implication on elements of management theory, Parkinson’s use of the
“Busiest Man” hypothesis as a supporting statement and qualifier to Parkinson’s law
should suggest a re-examination of works based upon the law. The present research
project might be one small step toward correcting an erosion of evidence-based theory,
and in the process, it may add to the store of rationality in a society that is increasingly
irrational, rejecting of science, and anecdotally based.
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